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INTRODUCTION
Israel does not have a written constitution or an entrenched bill
of rights.I In the unwritten hierarchy of legal authority that is Israel's
constitution,2 statutes are the highest written legal norms. Tradition-
ally, the courts have considered themselves powerless to strike down a
validly enacted statute. 3 They have thus limited their decisions to
interpretation and application of the statutes.
In cases arising under statutes that restrict expression, however,
Israel's Supreme Court has often gone beyond this limited view of its
power. In these cases, the Court has interpreted the statutes to narrow
their application. It has based its interpretation on unwritten norms
that it considers to be superior to statutes. According to the Court,
these suprastatutory norms are among the foundations of Israel's legal
system.
The objectives of this Note are to examine the adjudication of
freedom of expression issues under Israel's unwritten constitution and
to suggest implications of Israel's experience for adjudication under a
written constitution.4 The Note argues that the absence of a written
constitution gives the Israel Supreme Court great flexibility to recog-
nize freedom of expression interests in various contexts, but leads to
inconsistent recognition of these interests.
Section I outlines the sources of the law applied in Israeli freedom
of expression cases and sketches the evolution of Israel's unwritten
constitution. Section II describes and analyzes the development of the
Israel Supreme Court's activist approach to legislation restricting
1. An entrenched law is a law that cannot be amended or repealed except by a law
enacted by a special procedure. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. V. On forms of entrenchment,
see J. JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS 159-72 (1980). Entrenched laws provide a
basis for judicial review of statutes. In order to uphold entrenched laws, courts invalidate
inconsistent laws that are not enacted by the required special procedure. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-79 (1803); see infra Section I.B.3.
2. "Constitution" is the accepted term for the legal structure even in countries where
the structure is not set out in a document such as the United States Constitution. In Eng-
land, for example, the classic treatise on constitutional law is entitled "INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION" (A.C. Dicey, 8th ed. 1915). "Constitution" is defined
as follows: "The organic and fundamental law of a nation or state, which may be written
or unwritten, establishing the character and conception of its government .... organizing
the government, and regulating, distributing, and limiting the functions of its different
departments .... " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
3. The Israel Supreme Court has invalidated laws that were inconsistent with
entrenched laws and were not enacted by a special procedure. This review of the validity of
the enactment of a law contains an element of substantive review. See infra Section I.B.3.
4. Comparison of freedom of expression cases in Israel and in the United States helps
illustrate the differences between written and unwritten constitutions. See infra Section IV.
Because the courts in both countries are guided by similar norms, only the variable that is
being compared, the constitutional structure, differs. See Lahav, American Influence on
Israel's Jurisprudence of Free Speech, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 21 (1981); see also infra
notes 105, 106, 110, 166 and accompanying text.
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expression. Section III details trends in the Court's decisions after it
took an activist role and shows the effects of the absence of a written
constitution on the Court's performance. Section IV shows that there
are similarities in adjudication under written and unwritten constitu-
tions. Section IV also suggests that, to the extent the two kinds of
adjudication are similar, Israel's experience can be instructive to
American courts.
I. ISRAEL'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND SOURCES OF LAW
Israel's constitution is an unwritten hierarchy of legal authority
that has evolved as the result of a number of political events, legisla-
tive acts, judicial decisions, and traditions observed on all levels of the
legal system.5 The unwritten constitution also establishes the sources
of the law applied in the courts. Analysis of the Supreme Court's free-
dom of expression cases requires familiarity with the hierarchy of
authority and the sources of law.
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISRAEL
In 1917, Britain defeated Ottoman forces in Palestine.6 Five
years later, the League of Nations recognized British rule, granting
Britain the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine.7
The Mandate government vested legislative and executive powers
5. Unwritten constitutions have been called "flexible" constitutions, because they can
accommodate new arrangements more easily than written constitutions, which usually can
be amended only by special procedures and have therefore been called "rigid" constitu-
tions. See C. MCILWAIN, CONsTITUTIONALIsM ANCIENT AND MODERN 18 (1940).
6. The British commander immediately proclaimed martial law. In 1920, the military
government was replaced with civilian administration. See 3 L.P.* 2590; E. LIKHOVSKI,
ISRAEL'S PARLIAMENT 5 (1971). England claimed jurisdiction over Palestine on the basis
of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, 53 & 54 Vict., ch. 37, § 1. See Palestine Order in
Council, 1922, Preamble, 3 L.P. 2569, 2570.
* The following abbreviations will be used in these footnotes: H.H. Hatza'ot Iok (legis-
lative bills)
L.P. Laws of Palestine in Force on 31 December, 1933 (R. Drayton ed., rev. ed. 1934)
(legislation by British Mandate government)
L.S.I. Laws of the State of Israel (authorized English translation of Israeli legislation)
N.V. Laws of the State of Israel [New Version] (authorized English text of pre-1948 legis-
lation with post-1948 revisions)
O.H.Y. Osef Hukei Yisrael (unofficial collection of Israeli law including ordinances and
regulations by British Mandate government)
P.D. Piskei Din (official law reports of the Israel Supreme Court)
S.H. Sefer Hahukim (laws of the Knesset)
S.J Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel (authorized English translations
of Supreme Court decisions)
7. "The Mandatory power shall have full powers of legislation and of administration,
save as they may be limited by the terms of this Mandate." Mandate art. 1. 3 LEAGUE OF
NATIONS O.J. 1007 (1922).
1985]
250 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18:247
in the High Commissioner.8 The High Commissioner's executive
measures ("Regulations") were subordinate to his legislative enact-
ments ("Ordinances"), which in turn were subordinate to the King's
Orders in Council. In cases in which these three sources of Mandate
law did not provide a rule of decision, the courts were to apply Otto-
man law as it was in force in Palestine at the outbreak of World War I.
In the event that neither Mandate law nor Ottoman law provided a
rule of decision, the courts were to apply English common law and
equity. 9
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution of November
29, 1947,10 which called for the partition of Palestine into independent
Jewish and Arab states, led to the termination of the British Mandate
in Palestine on May 15, 1948. On May 14, the leaders of the Jewish
population issued the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of
Israel, I1 which provided for the creation of a legislative authority, the
Provisional Council of State.12 The Provisional Council's first legisla-
tive act, the Law and Administrative Ordinance, established con-
tinuity with Mandate law:
The law which existed in Palestine on... [May 14, 1948]... shall remain in
force, insofar as there is nothing therein repugnant to this Ordinance or to the
other laws which may be enacted by or on behalf of the Provisional Council of
State, and subject to such modifications as may result from the establishment
of the state and its authorities. 1
3
8. Palestine Order in Council, 1922, arts. 5, 17, 3 L.P. 2569, 2571, 2574. An elected
Legislative Council, which was to assume legislative authority, never came into being
because of conflict between the Arab and Jewish communities. See Palestine Order in
Council, 1922, art. 17, supra; E. LIKHOVSKI, supra note 6, at 6-7. In 1923, the idea of a
Legislative Council was abandoned, and legislative authority was permanently transferred
to the High Commissioner. See id.; Palestine (Amendment) Order in Council, 1923, art. 3,
3 L.P. 2590, 2591.
9. Palestine Order in Council, 1922, art. 46, 3 L.P. 2569, 2580. Israel retained this
link to English common law and equity, see infra text accompanying note 13, until 1980,
when the link was replaced with a link to "Israel's heritage":
1. Where the court, faced with a legal question requiring decision, finds no
answer to it in statute law or by analogy, it shall decide it in the light of the princi-
ples of freedom, justice, equity and peace of Israel's heritage.
2. (a) Article 46 of the Palestine Order in Council, 1922... is hereby repealed.
Foundations of Law, 5740-1980, 34 L.S.I. 181 (1979/80). On the possible influence of
this provision on adjudication of individual liberties cases, see infra note 82.
Israel severed any remaining connections to pre-state sources of law when it invalidated
the Mejelle, the Ottoman civil code. See Law to Invalidate the Mejelle, 5744-1984, § I,
1119 S.H. 156 (1984). On the issue whether the Mejelle had any force after the enactment
of Foundations of Law, § 2(a), supra, see Gavison, Abolition of the Mejelle as a Source of
Law (Hebrew), 14 MISHPATIM 325 (1984).
10. General Assembly Resolution (181(II)A) on the Future Government of Palestine,
Pt. I(A)(3), 1947-48 U.N.Y.B. 247, 248.
11. 1 L.S.I. 3 (1948).
12. Proclamation (issued with Declaration), May 14, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 6 (1948).
13. Law and Administration Ordinance § 11, 1 L.S.I. 7, 9 (1948).
ISRAEL'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION
Through this Ordinance, Israel inherited many Mandate laws that
severely restrict expression.14
B. LEGISLATIVE SOVEREIGNTY IN ISRAEL
1. The Failure to Adopt a Written Constitution
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State provided that
an elected constituent assembly would draft and adopt a constitu-
tion.15 The assembly convened in January of 1949, but failed to pro-
duce a constitution. 16 In addition to its constituent power, the
assembly inherited the Provisional Council's legislative power.17 The
assembly's first enactment was the Transition Law, 18 which provided
that the legislature would be called the "Knesset," that its enactments
would be called "laws," and that the constituent assembly would be
the first Knesset. 19
The Knesset formalized the postponement of the adoption of a
constitution in the "Chapter by Chapter Resolution. '20 This resolu-
tion assigned to the Constitution, Legislation, and Judiciary Commit-
tee the task of preparing a draft constitution comprising chapters
called "Basic Laws," to be submitted for the Knesset's approval one
by one. The Knesset has enacted eight Basic Laws on various sub-
jects,21 but has yet to adopt a written constitution.
Because there was no written constitution, the doctrine of legisla-
tive supremacy became the primary factor defining the structure of
Israel's legal system. "The failure of the Constituent Assembly to
14. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 87, 112; notes 153, 165, 170. See generally
Lahav, Israel's Press Laws, in PRESS LAW IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 265 (P. Lahav ed.
1985).
15. 1 L.S.I. 3, 4 (1948).
16. The failure to adopt a constitution was the result of ideological differences and the
majority party's resistance to restraint on its power. Representatives of the majority party
argued that it would be imprudent to freeze the structure of government and constrain the
legislature, because the country was undergoing drastic changes. Defense was insecure, the
economy was embryonic, and immigration was rapidly increasing the population and
changing its demography. Religious parties opposed the establishment of a supreme law
other than the Torah. See debates in DIVREI HAKNESSET (record of Knesset proceedings),
Feb. 1, 1950, reprinted in MISHTAR MEDINAT YISRAEL 288-302 (Gutmann & Levi eds. 3d
ed. 1976), summarized in English in A. ZIDON, KNESSET 289-92 (1967).
17. Constituent Assembly (Transition) Ordinance, 5709-1949, § 3, 2 L.S.I. 81 (1949).
18. Transition Law 5709-1949, 3 L.S.I. 3 (1949).
19. Id. §§ 1, 2(a).
20. The Resolution is reprinted in Shapira, Judicial Review Without a Constitution:
The Israeli Paradox, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 405, 410 (1983).
21. See Basic Law-The Knesset, 12 L.S.I. 85 (1957/58); Basic Law-Israel Lands, 14
L.S.I. 48 (1960); Basic Law-The President of the State, 18 L.S.I. 111 (1963/64); Basic
Law-The Government, 22 L.S.I. 257 (1967/68); Basic Law-The State Economy, 29
L.S.I. 273 (1974/75); Basic Law-The Army, 30 L.S.I. 150 (1975/76); Basic Law-Jerusa-
lem, Capital of Israel, 34 L.S.I. 209 (1979/80); Basic Law-Adjudication, 1110 S.H. 78
(1984).
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adopt a Constitution as the supreme law of the land resulted of neces-
sity in placing the Knesset at the apex of the legal system. It became
the supreme lawgiver, and its [laws] were recognized by the courts as
the supreme law."' 22 The Supreme Court has stated the doctrine of
legislative supremacy emphatically: "After a law has been passed in
the Knesset, we must bow our heads before it and not question its
prescriptions, determinations, or assumptions. '23
2. Other Factors Contributing to Legislative Power
The Knesset is a particularly powerful legislature in that it has
only one house. A unicameral legislature can act more quickly than a
bicameral legislature such as the United States Congress.24
The traditions of Israel's party system also contribute to legisla-
tive power. Although the Knesset is legally sovereign, political con-
trol over the legislative process is largely in the hands of the executive
branch. In Knesset elections, citizens vote for parties. The party coa-
lition that controls a majority of Knesset seats forms a government.
The tradition of collective responsibility normally requires that all par-
ties in the coalition either vote for the government's legislative propos-
als or leave the coalition. 25 The Knesset almost always passes the
government's legislative proposals; rejection is tantamount to a vote of
no confidence in the government. 26
3. A Caveat to Legislative Sovereignty: Judicial Review to Protect
Entrenched Laws
The only inroad on the Knesset's sovereignty has been the
Supreme Court's assertion of a limited power of judicial review in the
context of Basic Laws with entrenched clauses, i.e., clauses that can-
not be amended or repealed except by a special procedure.
Entrenched laws are inconsistent with the doctrine of legislative sover-
eignty, which holds that the legislature can do anything except bind its
22. E. LIKHOVSKI, supra note 6, at 17.
23. Bassul v. Minister of Interior, 19(1) P.D. 337, 349 (1965). See generally Likhovski,
The Courts and the Legislative Supremacy of the Knesset, 3 ISR. L. REv. 345 (1968).
24. One unicameral legislature, New Zealand's, has been criticized as too powerful
because it acts too quickly:
The unrivalled simplicity of our unicameral Parliament... has not been accompa-
nied by a heightened sense of restraint in the single chamber.... [T]he lightning
speed of our legislative process is not one of those characteristics in our system
which has excited either the admiration or emulation of democratic countries else-
where. In short, we pass far too much legislation and we pass it far too quickly.
Palmer, The Constitution and David Minogue, N.Z.L.J. 481, 482 (1976).
25. See E. LIKHOVSKI, supra note 6, at 147, 164-65.
26. The coalition sometimes frees its members from collective responsibility and allows
members to vote according to conscience. Id. at 165.
[Vol. 18:247
ISRAEL'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION
successors.
27
Section 4 of Basic Law-The Knesset provides: "The Knesset
shall be elected by general, national, direct, equal, secret and propor-
tional elections .... -28 The entrenching clauses of Basic Law-The
Knesset provide that any law inconsistent with section 4 must be
passed by a special majority of more than half of the Knesset's 120
members, as opposed to the normal majority of more than half of the
members voting.29 The Israel Supreme Court has protected the sec-
tion 4 principle of equality by invalidating inconsistent laws in the
three cases discussed below.
a. Bergman v. Minister of Finance
The first time that the Supreme Court invalidated a law of the
Knesset was in Bergman v. Minister of Finance,30 a case which some
commentators have viewed as Israel's Marbury v. Madison.3 1 The
invalidated law contradicted the section 4 principle of equality and
was enacted without the required special majority.32 The law pro-
vided that only parties already holding seats in the outgoing Knesset
could receive election campaign funds from the public treasury.33 The
Court rejected the Minister's argument 34 that "equal" under section 4
merely embodies the principle of "one person, one vote": "Each of the
adjectives 'general, [national], direct, proportional' has two aspects.
They point both towards the right to elect and towards the right to be
elected, and there is no reason not to give the word 'equal' the same
broad meaning. ' 35 The Court concluded that the "one person, one
vote" interpretation would allow a one-party system, which would be
27. The classic statement of the doctrine of legislative sovereignty is that "Parliament
can do everything but make a woman a man, and a man a woman." A.C. DICEY, supra
note 2, at 5. In the academic controversy that followed the enactment of the first
entrenched provisions in Israel, one school of thought argued that the provisions were
unenforceable because of their inconsistency with legislative sovereignty. See Supreme
Court Judge Witkon, Justiciability, I ISR. L. REV. 40, 55 (1966).
28. Basic Law-The Knesset § 4, 12 L.S.I. 85 (1957/58).
29. "Mhis section shall not be varied save by a majority of the members of the Knes-
set." Basic Law-The Knesset § 4, 12 L.SI. 85 (1957/58). The only other entrenched
laws are Basic Law-The Knesset §§ 44-45, 12 L.S.I. 85, at 89 (1958) and Basic Law-
The Government § 42, 22 L.S.I. 257, 264 (1967/68).
30. 23(1) P.D. 693 (1969), translated and commented on in 4 ISR. L. REV. 559 (1969).
31. E.g., Shetreet, Judicial Independence and Accountability in Israel, 33 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 979, 980 (1984); Nimmer, The Uses of Judicial Review in Israel's Quest for a
Constitution, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1217, 1218 (1970).
32. The law passed by a majority of the members of Knesset who were present, but at
one stage of the voting the number in favor was only twenty-four. 23(1) P.D. at 696. See
supra note 29 and accompanying text.
33. See Knesset and Local Authorities Elections (5730) (Financing, Limitation of
Expenses, and Auditing) Law, 5729-1969, 23 L.S.I. 53 (1968/69).
34. See 4 ISR. L. REV. at 561-62.
35. Id. at 562.
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inconsistent with Israel's conception of democracy.3 6
The Court did not confront the constitutional issue of its power to
invalidate a law inconsistent with a Basic Law.37 Instead, the Court
relied on the Attorney General's waiving objections to the Court's
deciding the case on its merits. Under the doctrine of legislative sover-
eignty, such a waiver by one of the parties, even the government, could
not relieve the Court of its duty to uphold the Knesset's laws.38 The
Court also based its avoidance of the constitutional question on expe-
diency: "the [substantive] problems ... call for speedy solution and
consideration of the preliminary constitutional questions would neces-
sitate a lengthy hearing on its own."' 39 This argument is also irrelevant
under the doctrine of legislative sovereignty. The Court's invalidation
of the law suggests that the Court was prepared to assume the role of a
constitutional court in cases involving entrenched provisions. How-
36. See id. at 563-64.
37. The Court framed the issue in terms of "the justiciability ... of the question
whether in practice the Knesset observed any self-imposed restriction by way of
'entrenching' a statutory provision." 4 ISR. L. REv. at 560 (emphasis added). The issue is
better defined as whether the Court had power to adjudicate. See Comment, id. at 577.
38. Support for this argument is found in an opinion casting doubt on the Court's
power to hear petitions against actions by the military from inhabitants of occupied territo-
ries. The first time that the Court heard a challenge to the confiscation of land in the
occupied territories, the government's attorney waived objections to the Court's jurisdic-
tion. Such objections would be based on the generally accepted view that under interna-
tional law the orders of military authorities in occupied territory have the status of
legislation, and the courts of the army's home country do not have the power to question
the validity of such orders. See Abu-Hilu v. State of Israel, 27(2) P.D. 169, 179-80 (1973)
(Witkon, J., concurring).
Judge Witkon disapproved of the view that the government's waiver of objections to
jurisdiction could be the basis for jurisdiction. "This consent [to a hearing on the merits],
which is given occasionally, with regard to specific topics, and with no commitment that it
will be given in all cases, makes our hearing a kind of arbitration conditioned on the con-
sent of the defendant. In my humble opinion, that is not why this Court was created." Id.
at 181. Despite his reservations, Judge Witkon joined the Court in hearing the case on its
merits. The Court's decision to hear petitions against the occupation authorities despite
doubts about jurisdiction was based on humanitarian concerns. "The judges ... feared a
situation in which the inhabitants of the territories would have no effective legal redress for
their grievances against the military government." M. NEGBI, KVALIM SHEL TZEDEK 21
(1981).
Judge Witkon's doubts about the Court's jurisdiction in Abu-Hilu have even greater
force in Bergman. In Abu-Hilu, the military's status as the legislative authority in the
occupied territories was solely a matter of international law. Under domestic law, the mili-
tary is controlled by the executive branch. Therefore, because the military was represented
in the case by the Attorney General (an officer of the executive branch), the legislative
authority in the occupied territories was also represented. In Bergman, the issue of legisla-
tive sovereignty had greater practical importance, because the Knesset's status as an
independent branch of government is a matter of domestic law, which has greater force in
domestic courts than international law. But the respondent, the Minister of Finance, was
an officer of the executive branch. Therefore, unlike in Abu-Hilu, the legislative branch was
unrepresented in Bergman, and the executive branch's waiver of objections to the Court'sjurisdiction should have had no bearing on the question of the legislative branch's immu-
nity from judicial review.
39. 4 ISR. L. REv. at 560.
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ever, the Court's failure to address the source of its power to adjudi-
cate suggests that the Court was not prepared to assume that role
explicitly.
The Knesset responded to the Bergman decision ambivalently.
On the one hand, the Knesset enacted a new law, introduced by the
government, that granted election financing for parties unrepresented
in the Knesset.4° It is possible that the government could have
achieved reenactment of the original law by the required special
majority. Thus, the government's choice to remove the inequality
from the law may indicate a willingness to submit to the Court's
power to protect entrenched laws.41 On the other hand, the Knesset
passed, by the required special majority,42 a law confirming the valid-
ity of all election laws that had been passed since Basic Law-The
Knesset.43 The purpose of the confirming law was to prevent Berg-
man-like challenges to those election laws. Although the Knesset did
not deny the Court's power to review laws that the Knesset might
enact in the future,44 the confirming law has been criticized for its
sweeping validation of existing laws that might have been inconsistent
with the section 4 equality principle.45
b. Derekh-Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority
Derekh-Eretz Association v. Broadcasting Authority46 involved
another law that disadvantaged small parties. 47 This time the Knesset
redistributed the statutory allocation of time for election propaganda
broadcasts on the state-owned television and radio stations. Before
1981, each party had received twenty-five minutes of radio time and
ten minutes of television time, plus four of radio time and four of TV
time for every Knesset seat that the party held in the outgoing Knes-
set.48 Less than three months before the 1981 elections, the Knesset
amended the law so that each party received twenty-three minutes of
40. See Knesset and Local Authorities Elections (5730) (Financing, Limitation of
Expenses and Audit) (Amendment) Law, 5729-1969, 23 L.S.I. 218 (1968/69).
41. An introductory note to the legislative bill states that the government proposed the
amendment in order to comply with the directions of the Bergman decision. See 846 H.H.
318 (1969).
42. Shapira, supra note 20, at 413.
43. See Elections (Confirmation of Validity of Laws) Law, 5729-1969, § l(a), 23
L.S.I. 221 (1968/69).
44. See id. § l(b), 23 L.S.I. at 221; see also Explanatory Note, 846 H.H. 322 (1969).
45. See Comment, 4 IsR. L. REV. 565, 578 (1969).
46. 35(4) P.D. 1 (1981).
47. In the election year of 1981, the two largest parties in the outgoing Knesset held 75
of the Knesset's 120 seats. Shamir & Arian, The Ethnic Vote in Israel's 1981 Elections, in
THE ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL-1981 (A. Arian ed. 1983) 91, 92. Ten parties won Knesset
seats in the 1981 election. Arian, Introduction, id. at 1, 9.
48. See Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law, 5719-1959, § 15, 13 L.S.I. 148
(1959), as amended 23 L.S.I. 216 (1969).
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radio time, eight minutes of TV time, and six of each for every Knesset
seat. 49 The amendment strengthened the position of established par-
ties vis-i-vis fledgling parties with little or no representation in the
Knesset. The Court unanimously held the amendment invalid because
it violated the section 4 principle of equality and had not been passed
by the required special majority.50
The judges' different approaches to the equality issue reflect dif-
ferent degrees of activism. All the judges agreed that it would be
unreasonable to guarantee all parties equal time on television and
radio, because established parties deserve more time than both new
parties and parties that have failed in previous elections.5 1 The judges,
however, disagreed on how to decide whether the amendment violated
section 4. Two judges argued that the Court was not competent to
decide what degree of equality of opportunity is reasonable under sec-
tion 4.52 In the absence of clear criteria, they accepted the original law
as a starting point, because the Knesset had confirmed the law's valid-
ity by a special majority. In their view, the amendment violated the
equality principle merely because it increased the established parties'
advantage.5 3
Two other judges, Judge Barak and Supreme Court President
Landau, refused to use the original law as a starting point. 54 They
held that the confirming law did not establish the original broadcast
law's conformity to the equality principle and that the Knesset's devia-
tion from the original law was irrelevant to the equality issue.55
Therefore, they judged the amendment against an independent,
abstract standard of equality: "is the [time allotted to the new parties]
below the tolerable minimum?" 56 President Landau found it unneces-
sary to determine what distribution of time would be fair.57 He based
his decision on the amendment's legislative history, which showed that
the Knesset "completely ignored the important problem of preserving
the equality of opportunity of a new party. '5 8
Judge Barak based his decision on broader grounds than did any
of the other judges: "the eight minutes allotted to the new parties for
49. See Elections (Modes of Propaganda) (Amendment No. 6) Law, 5741-1981, 1019
S.H. 198 (1981).
50. See Derekh-Eretz, 35(4) P.D. at 5.
51. See id. at 7-8 (per Landau, P.); id. at 11-14 (Barak, J., concurring); id. at 18-24(Shamgar, J., concurring); id. at 24-27 (Bejski, J., concurring); id. at 28 (Ben-Porat, J.,
concurring).
52. See id. at 23 (Shamgar, J., concurring); id. at 27 (Bejski, J., concurring).
53. See id. at 22-23 (Shamgar, J., concurring); id. at 27 (Bejski, J., concurring).
54. See id. at 8-9 (per Landau, P.); id. at 16 (Barak, J., concurring).
55. See id. at 9 (per Landau, P.); id. at 16 (Barak, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 9 (per Landau, P.); see id. at 16 (Barak, J., concurring).
57. See id. at 9.
58. Id. at 10.
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television broadcasts is not enough to enable them... to present their
positions to the public in a proper manner." 59 He admitted that
presenting the issue in this manner allowed wide judicial discretion,
but concluded that there was no better method than relying on a
judge's "common sense, life experience, and sense of lawyerly exper-
tise."' 60 The positions of Judge Barak and President Landau indicate
that at least some members of the Court will take an ambitious role in
examining the substantive validity of laws that might conflict with
entrenched clauses of Basic Laws.
c. Rubinstein v. Chairman of the Knesset
Rubinstein v. Chairman of the Knesset61 invalidated an amend-
ment that the Knesset passed after the 1981 elections to relieve the
financial burdens of parties that had overspent on the election cam-
paign. The Political Parties (Financing) Law of 197362 provides that
parties that win at least one seat in the Knesset are entitled to reim-
bursement of a certain amount of their election expenses from the state
treasury.63 The law also provides that fifteen percent of the financing
will be withheld if the party fails to limit its campaign expenses
according to guidelines set out in the law.64 After the 1981 elections,
the Knesset amended the law so that only twelve percent of the financ-
ing would be withheld for the first fifteen-million shekels of overspend-
ing.65 The amendment was applied retroactively to expenses from the
1981 elections.66
59. Id. at 14.
60. Id. at 16. In justifying his choice of a standard allowing broad judicial discretion,
Judge Barak stated:
[I]f we do not have the tools to decide whether the reduction of the new parties'
television time from ten to eight minutes violates the equality principle, we also do
not have the tools to decide whether a reduction to ... two minutes violates the
equality principle.... [I]n exercising judicial discretion we are not acting in a
precise, scientific manner, but I am afraid there is no better way.
Id. at 15-16.
After the Court's decision, the Knesset did not remove the inequality, but retained it by
passing an amendment by an absolute majority. However, the Knesset's action does not
appear to have been a display of disrespect for the Court. Apparently because of the
urgency of making a decision before the election, the Court issued an order without an
opinion. The Knesset subsequently enacted the new amendment. The Court published its
opinion only after the election. See Klinghoffer, Legislative Reaction to Judicial Decisions
in Public Law, 18 ISR. L. REv. 30, 33-34 (1983).
61. 37(3) P.D. 141 (1983).
62. Political Parties (Financing) Law, 5733-1973, 27 L.S.I. 48 (1972/73).
63. Id. §§ 3, 4, 27 L.S.I. at 49.
64. Id. §§ 7(a), 10(e), 27 L.S.I. at 51-52.
65. Political Parties (Financing) (Amendment No. 5) Law, 5742-1982, § 6, 1045 S.H
84, 85 (1982).
66. Id. § 9, 1045 S.H. at 86.
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The Court unanimously held that the amendment violated the
section 4 equality principle because its retroactive application discrim-
inated against parties that had kept their expenses within the statutory
limits. These parties had relied on the original law and would have
spent more if they had known that more financing would be available.
For this reason and because the amendment passed by fewer than
sixty-one votes, the Court struck it down.67
The most important aspect of Rubinstein was a statement by the
Court on its power to adjudicate, an issue that it had avoided in Der-
ekh-Eretz and Bergman. In both of those cases, the government
waived the argument that the Court does not have the power to decide
whether the Knesset is bound by entrenched provisions in Basic
Laws.68 In Rubinstein, the government once again waived this argu-
ment, seeking a decision on the merits, but noted that it reserved the
right to raise the argument in future cases. The Court responded that
the more times it decides such constitutional issues, the less likely it
will refrain from deciding them in the future, even if the government
should challenge the Court's jurisdiction.6 9
d. Significance of the Court's Review of Entrenched Laws
The section 4 cases do not have major practical consequences for
the Knesset's freedom of action. First, only two Basic Laws have
entrenched clauses, none of which contain absolute prohibitions. 70
Second, the Knesset can pass any law, notwithstanding entrenched
clauses in Basic Laws, if the government mobilizes enough support to
obtain a special majority in the Knesset. The Supreme Court is there-
fore limited to a determination of whether a law was properly enacted.
The section 4 cases nevertheless have great symbolic significance.
Primarily, they show that the Supreme Court is ready to act as a con-
stitutional court in the context of entrenched laws. Furthermore, sec-
tion 4 has given the Court lawmaking power in a politically sensitive
area. In deciding whether the Knesset has violated section 4, the
Court must judge the propriety of election laws by referring to the
abstract standard of "equality." If the Court finds that the Knesset
has acted improperly, the Knesset's prestige suffers. Even if the gov-
ernment can mobilize enough Knesset support to reenact an invali-
dated law by a special majority, such an action could tarnish the
government's image.
67. 37(3) P.D. at 147.
68. See Bergman, 4 ISR. L. REV. at 560; Derekh-Eretz, 35(4) P.D. at 6.
69. 37(3) P.D. at 147-48.
70. See supra note 29.
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It is unclear whether the Knesset will enact more entrenched
laws. The Knesset has been ambivalent to the Court's exercise ofjudi-
cial review. Furthermore, the fact that the Knesset has not passed an
entrenched law since the Bergman decision could mean that the Knes-
set does not want to limit further its freedom of action. Because of the
executive's power in the legislative process, however, it is always possi-
ble that a government whose leadership wants to strengthen the judici-
ary will introduce more Basic Laws with entrenched clauses.
C. SUPRASTATUTORY NORMS
In deciding freedom of expression cases, the Israel Supreme
Court does not review the validity of statutes as it does in cases involv-
ing section 4 of Basic Law-The Knesset. The government has regu-
lated expression through laws that do not involve entrenched
provisions in the Basic Laws. Therefore, the Court must resort to stat-
utory interpretation to protect freedom of expression. To justify
activist statutory interpretation, the Court invokes suprastatutory
norms. Although these norms have no formal status as positive law,
the Court characterizes them as fundamental to Israel's society and
legal system.
A major source of suprastatutory norms is the Declaration of the
Establishment of the State of Israel. The development of the Declara-
tion's legal status illustrates the Court's understanding of its lack of
power to overturn laws and its use of statutory interpretation to give
preferential treatment to freedom of expression.
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State provides: "The
State of Israel... will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envis-
aged by the prophets of Israel."' 71 The Supreme Court first considered
the legal status of the Declaration in one of its early opinions, Zeev v.
District Commissioner of Tel-Aviv. 7 2 The petitioner contested the gov-
ernment's seizure of his home for its use pursuant to emergency regu-
lations enacted by the Mandate government. He contended that the
Declaration was a "law" under the Law and Administration Ordi-
nance73 and that the Declaration implicitly repealed the regulations
because they were repugnant to the Declaration's guarantees of "free-
dom" and "justice." The Court rejected the suggestion that legislation
should be struck down because of its inconsistency with the
Declaration:
[T]he only object of the Declaration was to affirm the fact of the foundation
and establishment of the State for the purpose of its recognition by interna-
71. 1 L.S.I. 3, 4 (1948).
72. 1 P.D. 85 (1948), 1 S.J. 68 (1948-53).
73. Supra text accompanying note 13.
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tional law. It gives expression to the vision of the people and its faith, but it
contains no element of constitutional law which determines the validity of vari-
ous ordinances and laws, or their repeal.
7 4
The Court continued to deny litigants resort to the Declaration 75
until Kol Ha'am Co. v. Minister of Interior (Kol Ha'am /I),76 the 1953
landmark freedom of expression case. In that case, the government
had suspended the publication of a newspaper under a broad statutory
grant of discretion. 77 The Court departed from the Zeev rule and
referred to the Declaration in construing the government's discretion
narrowly:
It is true that the Declaration "does not consist of any constitutional law laying
down in fact any rule regarding the maintaining or repeal of any ordinances or
laws" [quoting Zeev], but insofar as it "expresses the vision of the people and
its faith" [id.], we are bound to pay attention to the matters set forth in it when
we come to interpret and give meaning to the laws of the State .... 78
Since the decision of Kol Ha'am II, the Court has used a wide
variety of sources of suprastatutory norms to interpret laws restricting
expression. In addition to the Declaration of the Establishment of the
State, the other sources of suprastatutory norms that the Court has
relied on are Israel's democratic form of government, 79 which requires
the free exchange of ideas; 80 the individual's natural rights of self-
expression and to receive information;81 and the history of the Jewish
people. 82
74. 1 S.J. at 71-72.
75. See El-Karbutli v. Minister of Defense, PSAKIM 'ELYON [a discontinued reporter]
97, 104 (1948). The Court stated: "This document [is not] a constitution, in light of which
the validity of laws must be tested, before the Constituent Assembly sets the basic constitu-
tion about which the Declaration itself speaks."
76. 7 P.D. 1140 (1953), 1 S.J. 90 (1948-53).
77. See infra text accompanying note 87.
78. 1 S.J. at 105.
79. "The system of laws under which the political institutions in Israel have been estab-
lished and function are witness to the fact that this is indeed a state founded on democ-
racy." Id.
80. The free exchange of ideas is "a process of investigating the truth, in order that the
state may learn how to reach the most satisfactory objective and know how to select the
line of action most calculated to bring about the achievement of that objective .... " Id. at
96.
81. [T]he right to freedom of expression serves not only as a means and instrument,
but also as an aim in itself, seeing that the internal need that everyone feels to give
open expression to his thoughts is one of the fundamental characteristics of
man.... [T]he importance of [freedom of expression] lies in the security that it
gives to the most thoroughly private interest, namely, the interest of every man, as
such, in giving expression to his personal characteristics and capabilities; to nur-
ture and develop his ego to the fullest extent possible; to express his opinion on
every subject that he regards as vital to him ....
Id. at 97.
82. The history of many peoples, and of the people of Israel first and foremost, is
full of examples without number, of men who have dared and ventured, without
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II. THE ISRAEL SUPREME COURT'S VIEW OF ITS POWER
IN FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION CASES
The Israel Supreme Court's view of its power in freedom of
expression cases has evolved from strict deference to the legislature to
limited activism. This Section describes the Court's initial deferential
approach and its subsequent adoption of an activist approach. This
Section also attempts to determine the limits of the Court's activism.
A. DEFERENCE IN THE EARLY YEARS
Two cases decided during the Court's first five years illustrate
that the Court83 recognized the value of freedom of expression but
deferred to statutory infringements upon that freedom. In Attorney
being deterred by the fear of punishment, to publish what their conscience dic-
tated, notwithstanding its prohibition on the part of the ruling authorities.
Id. at 105-06.
Jewish law has provided suprastatutory norms in many Israeli cases, including some
presenting civil liberties issues. See Albert, ConstitutionalAdjudication Without a Constitu-
tion: The Case of Israel, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1245, 1257-61 (1969). The role of Jewish law
as a source of suprastatutory norms might increase as a result of the adoption of "Israel's
heritage" as a supplementary source of law. See Foundations of Law § 1, supra note 9.
The explanatory notes to the legislative bill introducing Foundations of Law suggest that
the provision "Israel's heritage" has some connection to Jewish law, but avoid defining the
connection:
[Tihe court will guide itself by "the principles.., of Israel's heritage." This for-
mulation was chosen from various proposals in order to refer the judge to the
fundamental values and ethics of Israel's heritage, but without imposing on him
every rule of Jewish law (as did [article 46 of] the King's Order in Council with
regard to English law).
1361 H.H. 308 (1978). Two judges of the Supreme Court have predicted that the adoption
of "Israel's heritage" as a supplementary source of law, see supra note 6, will give a new
thrust to activist statutory interpretation. See Supreme Court Judge Agranat, The Contri-
bution of the Judiciary to the Legislative Endeavor (Hebrew), 10 IYUNEI MISHPAT 233, 255
(1984); Supreme Court Judge Barak, Judicial Law Making (Hebrew), 13 MISHPATIM 25,
35 (1983/84). On the principles that judges might draw from "Israel's heritage" in free-
dom of expression cases, see M. CARMILLY-WEINBERGER, CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN JEWISH HISTORY (1977).
The Court has drawn on suprastatutory norms in other contexts besides freedom of
expression, creating a "judicial bill of rights." Fogel v. Broadcasting Auth., 31(3) P.D. 657,
664 (1977). The Court has recognized the rights of equality before the law, bodily integrity
and human dignity, freedom of assembly, freedom to pursue an occupation, and freedom of
religious worship. See cases cited in Shapira, supra note 20, at 418-19 nn. 67, 69. The
effect of recognizing these rights is that the Supreme Court narrowly construes legislative
attempts to abridge them. See Cohen v. Minister of Defence, 16 P.D. 1023 (1962), 4 S.J.
160, 163 (1961-62).
83. Any description of the Court's positions must be qualified in light of the Court's
practice of hearing cases in less than full panels, normally three judges. See infra text
accompanying notes 185-90. Because the Court does not sit in full panel, its decisions are
not conclusive evidence of the positions of the Court as a body. The difficulty of analyzing
the Court as a body is exacerbated by the judges' tradition, apparently inherited from Eng-
land, of publishing separate opinions based on very similar grounds of decision. This Note
sometimes discusses individual opinions in detail in order to make maximal use of the
available evidence about the Court's positions.
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General v. Editor of "Davar"' 8 4 the Court held that it did not have the
power to use a summary procedure to punish for contempt defendants
who had written critical comments about the Court. One judge's
opinion rested on the importance of the freedom of the press: "The
very existence of the power to punish by this summary method is
likely to tie the hands of the press to too great an extent .... 5
In Kol Ha'am Co. v. Minister of Interior86 (Kol Ha'am 1), the
Minister of Interior closed a Communist newspaper pursuant to sec-
tion 19(2)(a) of the Press Ordinance. The Ordinance provides:
The [Minister of Interior] ... may... if any matter appearing in a newspaper
is, in [his] opinion .... likely to endanger the public peace,... suspend the
publication of the newspaper for such period as he may think fit .... 87
The newspaper had published an article that attacked the Jews who
were on trial in the Soviet "Doctors' Plot ' 88 and accused Zionist orga-
nizations of "taking on the total defense of the anti-Soviet criminals of
all kinds, including the fifth column of the Nazis."'8 9
In upholding the Minister's order, the Court refused to review his
factual determinations: "It is not for us to determine whether these
slanderous statements are likely to enrage to the point that they can
lead to a danger to the public peace. That is submitted by law to the
determination of the Minister of Interior... ."9 The Court held that
the Minister's determinations were "not without foundation" and did
not "exceed the confines of the statute." 91
84. 5 P.D. 1017 (1951).
85. Id. at 1054 (Agranat, J., concurring).
86. 7 P.D. 165 (1953) (per curiam).
87. Press Ordinance, 1933, O.H.Y. (Ordinances) 2920, 2933.
88. The "Doctors' Plot," an episode in Stalin's campaign of anti-Jewish terror, was a
fabrication of an alleged conspiracy of Jewish doctors, employees of the Kremlin, to mur-
der top Soviet leaders. See Y. GILBOA, THE BLACK YEARS OF SOVIET JEWRY 1939-1953
(1971).
89. 7 P.D. at 165-66.
90. Id. at 166.
91. Id. at 168. The Court showed similar deference in Stein v. Minister of Interior, 6
P.D. 867 (1952). The Minister revoked the petitioner's permit to publish a newspaper
because of his failure to satisfy a statutory requirement that daily newspapers appear at
least 12 consecutive days a month. The publisher asserted that the Minister revoked the
permit because he opposed Yiddish newspapers. The Minister denied a discriminatory
motive, but admitted that he enforced the statute leniently against Hebrew papers because
of a policy to promote the knowledge of Hebrew. Id. at 872. Nevertheless, the Court
upheld the revocation. In rejecting the publisher's discrimination argument, the Court
equated the Minister's discretion with a prosecutor's discretion to enforce the criminal code
differently against equally culpable defendants. Id. If the Court had been inclined to pro-
tect freedom of the press, perhaps it would have viewed the statute as granting the Minister
discretion to distribute social benefits and would have decided whether he had distributed
them according to reasonable criteria.
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B. THE BREAK FROM THE EARLY VIEW: KOL HA'AM 1
In Kol Ha'am 11,92 the Israel Supreme Court departed from its
earlier deferential approach to applying statutes. The Minister closed
two Communist newspapers by using his authority under section
19(2)(a) of the Press Ordinance, the statute that had been applied in
Kol Ha'am .93 The Minister found objectionable material in articles
that criticized the Israeli government's "anti-Soviet policy."' 94
In contrast to the approach taken in Kol Ha'am I, the Court did
not decline judicial review because of the statute's grant of discretion
to the Minister. 95 First, however, the Court paid lip service to the
grant of discretion, describing its review of the Minister's decision as
very limited. The Court stated that "the estimation of the effect of
matters published on the public peace ... is always within the sole
jurisdiction of the Minister of Interior. ' 96 At the same time the Court
warned that it would overturn a decision by the Minister if "he has
paid no consideration-or, at all events has paid mere cursory consid-
eration-to the important interest connected with the freedom of the
press."' 97 By reviewing the government's exercise of discretion, the
Court assigned greater weight to freedom of the press than does the
statute. 98 The Court's departure from the clear statutory grant of dis-
cretion 99 shows that the Court did not consider the doctrine of legisla-
92. Kol Ha'am Co. v. Minister of Interior, 7 P.D. 1140 (1953), 1 S.J. 90 (1948-53).
The Court in Kol Ha'am 11 made no reference to Kol Ha'am 1, even though it had been
decided only six months previously. This fact, together with the following introductory
remark, suggested that the Court had fundamentally reconsidered its role in freedom of
expression cases:
From time to time, a case reaches this court which raises some fundamental prob-
lem, demanding the reconsideration of ancient and well-worn principles .... We
are called upon to define the relationship that exists between the right to freedom
of the press... and.., the power ... to place a limit on the use of that right.
Id. at 94.
93. Supra, text acompanying note 87.
94. One article accused the government of offering the United States 200,000 Israeli
soldiers in the event of war with the Soviet Union. The article stated: "the masses, who
have started to understand [that] this government is dragging them ... to death in the
service of imperialism .... do not want this fate and will demonstrate their refusal." The
articles also accused Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and his "henchmen" of "speculating in
the blood of Israeli youth." 1 S.J. at 92-94.
95. Instead of treating its authority as a threshold question, the Court treated it in
passing near the end of the opinion: "We would like to add... a word about the phrase 'in
the opinion of the Minister of Interior . . . '" Id. at 115.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. A study of the history of Mandate press legislation concluded that the 1933 Press
Ordinance was a conscious effort by the Mandate government to subjugate the interest in
free expression to other needs. Lahav, Governmental Regulation of the Press: A Study of
Israel's Press Ordinance (pt. 1), 13 ISR. L. REV. 230, 233-34 (1978).
99. The legislative history of the Ordinance shows that it was intended to free the Man-
date government from the reliance on the courts that Ottoman law required to restrain the
press. Id. (pt. 2) at 489, 509-11.
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tive sovereignty to be sacred. The Court was unwilling, however, to
challenge the doctrine explicitly.
The Court also recast the statute's substantive criteria so as to
protect expression. The statute provides that to justify suppression,
printed material must be "likely to endanger the public peace." 1°° In
interpreting the term "likely," the Court rejected the "bad tendency"
test'0 1 in favor of a broad balancing test that it labelled the
"probability" test.10 2 The Court has interpreted the "probability" test
as a hybrid10 3 between the "clear and present danger" test1°4 and
Judge Learned Hand's modification of it in Dennis v. United States.105
The Court also narrowly construed the provision "endangers the pub-
lic peace." The Court stated that "any publication leading to the use
of violence by others, to the overthrow by force ... of the existing
regime, to the breach of the law, to the causing of riots or fighting in
public.., endangers the public peace."' 0 6 The Court lifted the suspen-
sion on publication, finding that the articles were not an "incitement
to the use of violent means in order to bring about a change in [the]
supposed policy of the Government" and did not advocate avoidance
of conscription.10 7
Kol Ha'am 11 is important because it transformed the Court's
role in freedom of expression cases. First, the Court asserted its
authority to review administrative decisions. 108 Second, it liberally
incorporated suprastatutory norms.10 9 Finally, it read a vague breach-
of-the-peace statute as if it were one of the very serious incitement
statutes at issue in the American cases that guided the Court.110 The
principles and techniques of Kol Ha'am II served the Court in later
100. Supra text accompanying note 87.
101. Under the "bad tendency" test, governmental action is justified if "the publication
reveals only a tendency-even a slight or remote tendency-in the direction of one of the
consequences. . . included in the notion 'endangers the public peace.'" Id. at 102. See 1
S.J. at 102-06.
102. Id. at 110-13.
103. See Levi v. Southern Dist. Police Commander, 38(2) P.D. 393, 410-11 (1984).
104. "The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenk v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
105. "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) 510 (quoting Hand, J., in lower court opinion)
(quotation marks and citation omitted).
106. 1 S.J. at 102 (citing with approval Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(reversing "breach of peace" conviction on overbreadth grounds)).
107. 1 S.J. at 117.
108. See infra note 184, and note 149 accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 79-82 and text accompanying note 78.
110. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (advocacy of criminal anarchy);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (inciting resistance to United States); Schenk
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (causing insubordination in military).
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cases involving statutes granting discretion to regulate expression for
little or no reason.111
C. CASES UNDER SECTION 94 OF THE 1945 EMERGENCY
DEFENCE REGULATIONS
More than any other law in Israel, section 94 of the 1945 Emer-
gency Defence Regulations reflects legislative disregard for the free-
dom of expression. Section 94 provides:
(1) No newspaper shall be printed or published unless the proprietor thereof
shall have obtained a permit under the hand of the District Commissioner ....
(2) The District Commissioner, in his discretion and without assigning any
reason therefor, may grant or refuse any such permit... and may at any time
suspend or revoke such permit .... 112
By exempting the Commissioner from stating the reasons for his deci-
sions, paragraph 2 grants the Commission absolute discretion and
deprives the courts of a basis for review of his decisions.113
The cases under section 94 have produced some of the Court's
most bewildering opinions. Although no consistent approach to free-
dom of expression emerges from these cases, a survey of them sheds
light on the limits of the Court's activism in statutory interpretation.
In El-Ard v. Northern District Commissioner,114 the first challenge
to the use of section 94, the petitioners sought to overturn a rejection
of their application to publish a newspaper. They alleged that the
Commissioner discriminated against them because they were Arabs.
They further demanded that the Commissioner be forced to reveal the
reasons for his refusal. 115 The Court refused to order the Commis-
sioner to reveal his reasons, "because the petitioner did not point to
any act or statement of the Commissioner" to substantiate the allega-
tion of discrimination.1 16
Fifteen years later the next section 94 case came before the Court.
In El-As'ad v. Minister of Interior,117 the Minister revealed his reasons
for denying an application to publish a magazine, even though he was
not required to do so. He asserted that El-As'ad was a member of the
Communist Party, which is illegal under Jordanian laws in force in the
West Bank, and that El-As'ad intended his magazine to be an organ of
the Communist Party in the West Bank.1 18 However, on grounds of
state security, the Minister refused to reveal the sources of the infor-
111. See infra Section III.A, B.
112. 3 O.I.Y. (Regulations) 1247, 1292.
113. EI-Ard Co. v. Northern Dist. Comm'r, 18(2) P.D. 340, 345 (1964).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 344.
116. Id. at 345.
117. 34(1) P.D. 505 (1979).
118. Id. at 512.
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mation on which he based his decision. 119
The Court held that by revealing his reasons, the Minister sub-
jected his decision to judicial review.120 The Court also held that the
absence of supporting evidence rendered evaluation of the Minister's
assertions impossible. 121 Therefore, the Court overturned the denial of
the application.
Despite the narrow basis of the holding, the Court made clear
that it was unsympathetic to the Minister's decision. First, the Court
stated that it saw little merit in the Minister's reasons for denying the
license, because the petitioner did not write inflammatory material. 22
Second, the Court was strict with the government on a procedural
point. The Court advised the government that in any future section 94
case in which it gives reasons but refuses on security grounds to dis-
close the evidence on which the decision is based, the government
should ask the Court to rule that state security precludes disclosure of
the evidence. 123 However, in El-As'ad, when the government asked
the Court at oral argument to decide whether state security precluded
disclosure of the evidence, the Court refused to rule on the request,
stating that it was untimely. 124
In the next section 94 case, Mah ul v. Jerusalem District Commis-
sioner,125 the government followed the procedure that the Court sug-
gested in El-As'ad. The Commissioner refused the petitioner's
application to publish a magazine, stating that "security reasons pre-
vent him from revealing his reasons,"' 126 and asked the Court to rule
that state security precluded disclosure of the information on which
his denial was based. After examining the government's evidence, the
Court decided not only that considerations of state security precluded
disclosure of the evidence, but also that there were "weighty reasons
119. Id. at 513.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 514-15.
122. I do not fear that granting the requested permit is liable to really harm state
security. It is better not to harm, at least for now, the principle of freedom of
expression and to put the petitioner and his magazine to the test of reality. And if
it turns out that there was a basis for the Commissioner's stated reasons and that
the magazine will serve as a platform for inciteful or inflammatory material, the
Commissioner can immediately use his authority and revoke the permit, as pro-
vided in Regulation 94(2). In this context I will also note that no examples of the
petitioner's articles ... were presented to us that indicate an inciteful or inflam-
matory tendency in his writing.
Id. at 516-17 (emphasis added).
123. See id. at 515-16.
124. "I do not think that we should respond favorably to this suggestion, which comes
at the last moment; rather, the matter should be adjudicated on the basis of the Commis-
sioner's affidavits, which were certainly drafted after full consideration." Id. at 516.
125. 37(1) P.D. 789 (1982).
126. Id. at 791.
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for the Commissioner's refusal of the petitioner's application."' 127
The Court should not have addressed the reasonableness of the
denial of the application. The statute allowing evidence to be withheld
on security grounds provides that if the Supreme Court finds the
security interest overriding, the evidence is inadmissible. 2 8 The deci-
sion in Mahul is inconsistent with this statute, because the Court used
the evidence to decide whether the denial of the application was rea-
sonable. Furthermore, the propriety of a decision based on evidence
that the opposing party cannot rebut is questionable. 2 9 Most impor-
tantly, the Court's stature as a neutral body is compromised when it
decides a case on the basis of protected evidence.' 30 Finally, when the
Court decides on the basis of protected evidence, it is impossible to
analyze the Court's view of the merits of the case, and the Court is
thus shielded from public accountability. Despite these problems, the
Court has continued to decide section 94 cases on the merits, based on
evidence that the petitioner cannot rebut.131
In 'Asli v. Jerusalem District Commissioner, 32 however, the gov-
ernment presented some evidence, making it possible to analyze the
Court's view of the merits of the case. The Commissioner had revoked
the petitioner's newspaper license upon concluding that the newspaper
was the mouthpiece of a terrorist organization, the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine.1 33 The Minister asked the Court to pro-
tect information that showed that the Popular Front controlled the
paper, but he submitted into evidence an analysis of the paper's
content. 134
The Court found that the paper's content did not support the
government's contentions. Furthermore, the Court observed that the
editors followed the regulations requiring submission of material to a
military censor before publication.1 35 Nevertheless, the Court upheld
the Commissioner's revocation because the privileged information
supported the government's contentions. "[T]he license was revoked
not because of the content, but because of the close and direct connec-
127. Id. at 795.
128. Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 5731-1971, §§ 44-46, 2 N.V. 198-208. To
make this determination, the Court must weigh the seriousness of the security interest
against the justice that disclosure would serve. Id. §§ 44(a), 45.
129. See El-Ard, 18(2) P.D. at 344 (Berinson, J., concurring).
130. Rettig, The Sting: Privileged Evidence, the Obligation to Give Reasons for Adminis-
trative Decisions, and Freedom of Expression (Hebrew), 14 MISHPATIM 108, 115 (1984).
131. See Adib-Ayub v. Jerusalem Dist. Comm'r, 38(1) P.D. 750, 754 (1984); 'Asli v.
Jerusalem Dist. Comm'r, 37(4) P.D. 837, 840 (1983).
132. 37(4) P.D. 837 (1983).
133. Id. at 838.
134. Id. at 839.
135. See id. at 838, 840.
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tion between the newspaper and the terrorist organization."'' 36 This
position contradicts El-As'ad, where the Court was more interested in
the publisher's writing than his political ties. 137
D. THE LIMITS OF THE COURT'S ACTIVISM: COMPARISON
BETWEEN SECTION 94 CASES AND KOL HA'AM 1
The section 94 cases point to some of the factors that limit the
Court's activism in statutory interpretation. Those cases and Kol
Ha'am II are on opposite ends of the spectrum of the Court's
approach to statutory interpretation. A comparison between section
94 of the 1945 Emergency Defence Regulations and the statute in Kol
Ha'am II, section 19(2)(a) of the Press Ordinance, leads to some con-
clusions about the factors that will determine the Court's position on
that spectrum in a given case.
The most obvious difference between the two statutes is the lan-
guage. Section 19(2)(a) sets forth the "likely to endanger the public
peace" standard for the Court to apply in reviewing a suspension of
publication. The Court interpreted this standard narrowly. Section
94, on the other hand, leaves little room for interpretation, because it
sets no standard that the government must satisfy in order to refuse or
suspend a license to publish. The Court has limited the potential use
of section 94 by holding that a statement of reasons subjects the deci-
sion to judicial review. But the Court has consistently refused to
require a statement of reasons unless the petitioner shows that the gov-
ernment acted out of discrimination, 138 i.e., with a motive that would
be irrelevant to any legitimate state interest. The section 94 cases
show that the Court still observes the doctrine of legislative sover-
eignty to some degree. Section 94 cannot be construed to conform to
the freedom of expression principles of Kol Ha'am II. The Court
apparently thinks that the only other way to uphold these principles-
to refuse to apply section 94-would be too blatant an affront to legis-
lative sovereignty.
Another difference between section 19(2)(a) and section 94 is
their sources. Israel inherited section 19(2)(a) from the British Man-
date, and the Knesset has not amended it. Although section 94 is also
inherited, the Knesset has reinforced it. In 1958, the Knesset passed a
law confirming provisions like section 94 that exempt administrative
authorities from stating reasons for their decisions. 139 The Court has
136. Id. at 840.
137. See supra note 122.
138. See Adib-Ayub, 38(1) P.D. at 752-53; Mahul, 37(1) P.D. at 792; El-Ard, 18(2) P.D.
at 343.
139. See Administrative Procedure Amendment (Statement of Reasons) Law, 5719-
1958, § 3(1), 13 L.S.I. 7 (1958/59).
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cited the 1958 law in all the section 94 cases in which the government
refused to state reasons. 14° In addition, as the Court has noted, the
Knesset amended the Defence Regulations without amending section
94.141 Therefore, section 94's survival is not the result of legislative
oversight. The Court showed its sensitivity to the sources of statutes
in El-As'ad, when it described section 94 as a "Draconian [rule] that
was promulgated by a colonial regime." 142
These factors suggest that the Court is more deferential to stat-
utes passed or at least acted on by the Knesset than to pre-1948 stat-
utes that have remained intact. In fact, in cases involving statutory
barriers to judicial review similar to section 94, three judges have
stated that in some circumstances pre-1948 legislation is entitled to
less deference than the laws of the Knesset. 143
140. See Adib-Ayub, 38(1) P.D. at 752; Mahul, 37(1) at 792; El-Ard, 18(2) P.D. at 342.
141. See El-Ard, 18(2) P.D. at 345.
142. EI-As'ad, 34(1) P.D. at 513.
143. In Nationalist Circles v. Minister of Police, 24(2) P.D. 141 (1970), noted in Klein,
The Temple Mount Case, 6 ISR. L. REV. 257 (1971), Judges Silberg and Agranat stated
that the Court can strike down Mandate laws that are inconsistent with the principles
underlying the establishment of the State. This position is similar to the one that the Court
unanimously rejected in Zeev, supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. Nationalist Cir-
cles involved interpretation of section 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, which
provides: "[Tihe law which existed in Palestine on 14th May, 1948 ... will remain in force
... subject to such modifications as may result from the establishment of the state." Supra
text accompanying note 13 (emphasis added). The Court first interpreted "modifications"
in a challenge to the requisition of an apartment for government use under the Defence and
Emergency Regulations. See Leon v. Acting Dist. Comm'r of Tel Aviv, 1 P.D. 58 (1948),
1 S.J. 41 (1948-53). The petitioner argued that one "modification" of pre-State law was an
implicit repeal of these Regulations, because they were dictatorial and "were directed
towards destroying ... the development of the country by the Jews; thus they are incom-
patible with the establishment of a democratic, Jewish state." Id. at 48. The Court
rejected this argument:
It would require that this court first determine that the establishment of the State
has brought about some change and the nature of the change; and then consider
whether this change requires that a particular law be invalidated ....
We are not prepared to... repeal laws which undoubtedly do exist but which
are unacceptable to the public .... for in so doing we would infringe upon the
rights of the existing... legislative authority ....
Id. at 52, 54.
The Court read "modifications" as referring only to technical changes in laws. For exam-
ple, Allenby Bridge, which had been part of the Mandate territory but was in Jordanian
territory after the establishment of the state, would be deleted from an order listing the
lawful places of entry into Palestine. Similarly, the word "Palestine" would be replaced
with "Israel" in all laws. Id. at 53. The technical interpretation of "modifications" became
known as the "Allenby Bridge" approach.
Judges Silberg and Agranat abandoned the "Allenby Bridge" approach in Nationalist
Circles. The petitioners sought to enjoin the police to allow Jewish prayers on the Temple
Mount, a holy place to Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. The Court held that it lacked
jurisdiction over the case because of section 2 of the Palestine (Holy Places) Order in Coun-
cil, 1924: "[N]o cause or matter in connection with the Holy Places... shall be heard or
determined by any Court in Palestine .. " 3 L.P. 2625. Judge Silberg argued that section
2 is invalid because the denial of jurisdiction is inconsistent with the establishment of a free,
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The Court's greater deference to the laws of the Knesset suggests
that the activist role that the Court played in Kol Ha'am 11 and other
cases might end. If the Knesset enacts laws that are as repressive as
section 94, and if the Court duly applies them, the Kol Ha'am II
period will look like a transitional phase in which the Court merely
oversaw the replacement of colonial laws with native counterparts.
The attitude of the government and the Knesset toward the Court
indicates that this scenario is unlikely. The Knesset has not statutorily
overturned any of the Court's freedom of expression decisions. More-
over, the Knesset has acceded, albeit somewhat begrudgingly, to the
Court's exercise of the power of judicial review in cases concerning
democratic state. This argument was based on an expansive interpretation of the "modifi-
cations" provision:
I think it would... degrade the great historical event of the creation of a Jewish
state in the land of Israel, if we were to [accept the "Allenby Bridge" interpreta-
tion].... My heart of hearts is with those "maximalists" who see in our national
independence... a renewal of national life. If this is the essence of independence,
it is certainly possible.., to examine the pulse of every Mandate law to see if it
suits the spirit that pervades the laws of our free, independent state ....
24(2) P.D. at 158 (Silberg, J., concurring).
Judge Agranat, who held that section 2 remained in force, nevertheless departed from
the "Allenby Bridge" approach as well:
The Court must examine with great caution before it decides that a Mandate law is
implicitly repealed because of a "modification" resulting from the establishment of
the state; ... the contradiction between the two must be so stark that there is no
escape from the conclusion that in the state of Israel that law has lost its right to
exist.
Id. at 279, 280 (Agranat, J., concurring). The only difference between the positions of
Judges Agranat and Silberg on the issue of deference to Mandate laws is that Judge
Agranat committed himself to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. See infra text
accompanying note 220.
Judge Sussman expounded an especially activist position on construing Mandate laws in
Kardosh v. Registrar of Companies, 15 P.D. 1151, 4 S.J. 7,further hearing, 15 P.D. 1209
(1961), 4 S.J. 32, (1961-62). The petitioners in Kardosh contested the denial, on grounds of
state security, of their application to form a publishing company. See 4 S.J. at 10-11.
Mandate law gives the government "absolute discretion" to deny such an application. See
Companies Ordinance, 1929, §§ 4, 14, 1 L.P. 169, 171-72, 175.
One of the issues was whether, in light of the grant of "absolute discretion," the Court
had jurisdiction to review the government's decision. Judge Sussman refused "to attach
decisive importance to the language of the legislator .... [M]ore important than his lan-
guage is the subject dealt with .... " 4 S.J. at 36-37. In concluding that the Court had
jurisdiction, Judge Sussman argued that circumstances had changed since the Companies
Ordinance was enacted:
It may be presumed that when in 1929 the High Commissioner under the Mandate
reserved a discretion to refuse registration.... he had in contemplation the special
circumstances of the territory of the Mandate, inhabited by a population divided
into two communities between whom good relations did not reign .... But not
only is the Government which inherited the powers of the High Commissioner
bound, unlike him, by the jurisdiction of this court, but today in the State of Israel
we are not obliged to decide as the court might have decided in 1922. Life changes
and the law dare not become petrified.
Id. at 40. The Court overturned the denial of the application by a 3-2 decision. However,
the other two majority judges avoided stating that Mandate laws are entitled to less than
full deference. See id. at 22-26 (per Agranat, J.); id. at 28 (Witkon, J., concurring).
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section 4 of Basic Law-The Knesset, even though the Court's power
in this area is unclear. The government's use of section 94, especially
in recent years, shows that the government is not enthusiastic enough
about the Court's most liberal statements on freedom of expression to
implement them through legislative reform. On the other hand, the
government has acquiesced in the Court's decisions. For example,
after Kol Ha'am II, section 19(2)(a) of the Press Ordinance "[fell] into
disuse," 144 and only one case involving section 19(2)(a) has reached
the Court since Kol Ha'am II. 145 The government has also allowed
the Court to review the use of section 94 of the 1945 Regulations.
The conduct of the government and the Knesset suggests that the
Court's prestige would prevent the Knesset from risking a constitu-
144. Lahav, supra note 99, at 519.
145. 'Omar Int'l, Inc. v. Minister of Interior, 36(1) P.D. 227 (1981). The political back-
ground of the 'Omar case was the government's decision to replace the military adminis-
tration in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip with a civilian administration. Arabs in
the occupied territories protested the switch, sometimes using violent tactics. In one inci-
dent, Yussef El-Hatib, whom the Israeli authorities had appointed as a leader of an Arab
group that cooperated with the authorities, and his son were shot. El-Hatib was critically
injured, and his son was killed. Id. at 233. The Arab-owned, English-language weekly Al-
Fair reported the violence favorably. It also stated that nobody visited the El-Hatib family
to express condolence after the shooting, accused El-Hatib of various acts of collaboration
"against his own people," and stated that he had "sided with the Israeli occupiers." Id. at
234. Next to the article about El-Hatib was a cartoon modeled on the David and Goliath
story. An Israeli soldier was trying to inflate a balloon with the name of El-Hatib's group
written on it, and the balloon exploded when a boy shot a rock at it with a slingshot.
The government closed the paper under section 19(2)(a) of the Press Ordinance on the
ground that the reporting of the violence in the territories was "praise of the acts of murder
and terror and encouragement to continue them." Id. at 234. The Court agreed with this
assessment and held that the government had acted properly under Kol Ha'am 11's
"probability" test. Id. at 234-35.
In addition to the Al-Fajr case, the government decided to close a paper under section
19(2)(a) in 1975. Apparently fearing public reaction, the government planned to keep the
decision secret until implementation. But news of the decision leaked to the press, and the
government reversed its decision. M. NEGBI, supra note 38, at 151.
Professor Lahav has described the suspension of Al-Fajr under section 19(2)(a) as the
breaking of a "taboo" that had existed since Kol-Ha'am II. Lahav, supra note 14, at 273.
In her view, the government has returned to the use of sections 19(2)(a) and 94 in recent
years because it perceives an increased tension between freedom of expression and national
security:
Until 1967, the Israeli press had been relatively homogeneous. The legitimacy of
the State of Israel and the essence of Zionism-that the liberation of the Jewish
people requires Jewish political sovereignty-were not quesitoned. Criticism, how-
ever intense, was conducted within this ideological framework.... This homoge-
neity did not survive the 1967 War. Palestinian newspapers, located in East
Jerusalem, identified with Palestinian nationalism and expressed their support for
the Palestinian cause as well as their opposition to Israeli policies, oftentimes in
vociferous language. In the reaction of Israel's government one could see the
dilemma of Israeli liberalism. On the one hand, the government wished to pursue
its commitment to the democratic process and press freedom. On the other hand,
it faced, for the first time, a coalition of experienced newspapers that viewed itself
as an arm of the Palestinian struggle and expressed itself accordingly.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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tional confrontation through totally disregarding the Court's freedom
of expression principles.
The scenario described above is also based on the unrealistic
assumption that the Court would not stand its ground in a constitu-
tional confrontation. It is true that the Court has adhered to the doc-
trine of legislative sovereignty in most of its rhetoric and has couched
its decisions in terms of statutory interpretation. But the Court's deci-
sions also show that it sees itself in part as a lawmaking body and
would fight any serious threat by the Knesset to the values that the
Court considers fundamental to Israeli society. The Court has placed
itself above the legislature in several cases in the areas of freedom of
expression, Knesset elections, and military administration of occupied
areas. 146 The basis for the Court's power in these cases is often
unclear, but the results suggest that in areas that the Court considers
to be important, it will not easily submit to the Knesset.
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF
ADJUDICATION UNDER AN UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION
A. FLEXIBILITY IN THE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS
The absence of a written constitution gives the Israel Supreme
Court great flexibility in recognizing the right to freedom of expression
in contexts that it has not yet considered. Because the Court draws
constitutional principles from an amorphous body of sources, it wor-
ries less about the characterization of rights than do American courts,
who often wrestle with the Constitution's language when encountering
an activity that resembles a protected activity but occurs in a new con-
text.147 One member of the Israel Supreme Court was especially can-
did in describing the Court's flexibile approach to protecting the
individual against the government:
I do not deny the well-known rule-which from abundant use has become
146. On the Supreme Court's review of the acts of the military government in the occu-
pied territories, see generally M. NEGBI, supra note 38.
147. See infra section IV.A. In Kol Ha'am II, for example, the Court was not con-
cerned about finding the precise name of the right at stake: "we regard the freedom of the
press as one specific form of the freedom of expression, and we shall ... not distinguish
between the two concepts." I S.J. 90, 94 (1948-53). Similarly, when the Court recognized
the right to freedom of assembly and procession, it was unconcerned about the right's exact
source and name.
[Tihe law of the state of Israel recognizes fundamental human liberties, as com-
monly accepted in enlightened states. Among those liberties is the right of assem-
bly and procession. Whether we see those liberties as liberties that stand in and of
themselves, or whether we see in them a manifestation of the freedom expression
(and we need not decide this question), they have great importance in the formation
of the character of our democratic regime.
Saar v. Minister of Interior, 34(2) P.D. 170, 171 (1980) (emphasis added).
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largely depreciated-that the High Court of Justice148 will not substitute its
discretion for that of a competent authority. Yet when the matter is of high
public importance and the area of doubt does not necessitate special expertise
but is open, clear and obvious to all-in such a case we do not defer to the
competent authority but the court, if it sees fit, will reverse the decision of that
authority. 149
If the Court will assume an activist role whenever "the matter is of
high public importance," it can recognize a wider range of individual
liberties than can an American court reviewing legislative violations of
prohibitions specifically set out in the Constitution. x50
B. INCONSISTENT RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND APPLICATION
OF DOCTRINE
The danger in not having a written constitution is that by defer-
ring to the legislature, courts can ignore rights established in earlier
cases but asserted in new contexts. The following survey of cases sub-
sequent to Kol Ha'am II shows that the Israel Supreme Court has
been inconsistent in applying the principles of that case in new
contexts. 151
1. Recognition of Rights
Eight years after Kol Ha'am II, the Court decided Forum Films
Ltd. v. Film & Theatre Censorship Board.152 The Board' 53 approved a
148. On the Supreme Court's jursidiction as the High Court of Justice, see infra note
191.
149. Israel Film Studios Ltd. v. Geri, 16 P.D. 2407 (1962), 4 S.J. 208, 230 (1961-62)
(Silberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
150. The United States Supreme Court has, however, recognized rights unexpressed in
the Constitution, such as the right to travel and the right of privacy. When the Court acts
in this fashion, it has as much flexibility as the Israel Supreme Court and is actually operat-
ing under an unwritten constitution. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27
STAN. L. Rav. 703, 708-09 (1975). However, when the United States Supreme Court acts
under the written Constitution, it encounters obstacles that the Israel Supreme Court does
not face. See infra Section IV.A.
151. This survey of post-Kol Ha'am II cases does not evaluate whether the Court struck
the proper balance between freedom of expression and the competing governmental inter-
est. Such an evaluation would be unenlightening for the comparison of written and unwrit-
ten constitutions; courts in any system may misapply even the most protective standards.
Rather, this survey evaluates the Court's consistency. See infra Section III.B.3. on the
importance of consistency. For the purpose of this survey, a decision is consistent with Kol
Ha'am 11 if the Court recognized a freedom of expression interest and gave it serious con-
sideration, regardless of whether the Court preferred that interest over the governmental
interest.
152. 15 P.D. 611 (1961).
153. The Cinematograph Films Ordinance provides:
No cinematograph film shall be exhibited unless it shall have been authorised for
exhibition by the [Censorship] Board .... The Board may in its discretion grant
... or withhold authority for the exhibition of any film ....
Cinematrograph Films Ordinance, 1927, §§ 4(1), 6(2), 1 L.P. 135, 136 (emphasis added).
The ordinance provides no criteria for the exercise of discretion.
274 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
German documentary about Israel, but required that the German nar-
ration be replaced with a Hebrew narration. The Court found this
condition on approval to be reasonable, even though the Board had
approved other German films without imposing such a condition.154
The Court did not mention the existence of a freedom of expression
issue.
The Court's approach was quite different in Israel Film Studios
Ltd. v. Geri.'5 5 In this film censorship case, the Court applied the
principles of Kol Ha'am II. The petitioner's newsreel depicted riots
that started when police officers forcibly evicted squatters from a Tel
Aviv slum. The Censorship Board banned the newsreel because its
depiction of the officers' conduct was unbalanced and, the Board
asserted, would encourage disrespect for the law. In overturning the
ban, the Court stated that a camera cannot be everywhere during fast-
moving events; balanced reporting may not be possible in a riot. The
Court also based its decision on general principles established in Kol
Ha'am II: the value in a democracy of discussion of public issues 56
and the individual's right to receive information. 57
In a later film censorship case, Ein-Gal v. Film & Theatre Censor-
ship Board,158 the Court again switched its focus by restricting Israel
Film Studios to its facts. The Board banned 'Ein-Gal's film on the
Jewish-Arab struggle over Palestine because it "maliciously distort[ed]
historical facts."' 59 'Ein-Gal argued that even if the Board's finding
were true, the ban would be unjustified under the principles of Israel
Film Studios. The Court responded that while the Israel Film Studios
petitioner faced an insurmountable technical obstacle to making a bal-
anced presentation in a newsreel, 'Ein-Gal did not face such an obsta-
cle when presenting facts in a historical film. 1 60 Moreover, the Court
argued, the Israel Film Studios rule applies only to documentaries;
'Ein-Gal's film "pretended to be documentary but is actually a tenden-
tious presentation of the historical facts."1 61 The Court ignored the
154. [B]ecause the film is not just an entertainment film [as were the other German
films that the Board had approved] but a documentary depicting the new reality in
this country, it is not proper or in good taste that the narration... be in German.
The Board is a public, representative body; thus it was given wide authority
under... the Cinematograph Films Ordinance; if it is of the opinion that German
narration does not suit the content and purpose of the film, we are not prepared to
say that this opinion was unreasonable.
15 P.D. at 613.
155. 16 P.D. 2407 (1962), 4 S.J. 208 (1961-62).
156. 4 S.J. at 216-17.
157. See 4 S.J. at 216-17; see also supra note 81.
158. 33(1) P.D. 274 (1979).
159. Id. at 275.
160. Id. at 277.
161. The Court purported to base its finding on the film's inciteful character and, citing
Kol Ha'am II, on the probability of danger to the public peace:
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statements in Kol Ha'am II and Israel Film Studios about a democ-
racy's need for the free flow of information 62 and the individual's
right to know. 163
Other cases further illustrate the Court's inconsistent approach to
freedom of expression cases. In 'Omer v. State of Israel, the Court
applied a balancing test. 164 The Court upheld a conviction under a
statute prohibiting the holding and distribution of "obscene mat-
ter." 65 It recognized, however, the possibility that a "redeeming
social value"' 166 can outweigh the harmful aspects of pornography. 67
The Court held that under the circumstances the defendant's social
message could not protect him from conviction.' 68
Two years later, in Keynan v. Film & Theatre Censorship
If distortion of historical facts were the only issue, this would not justify banning
the film ... in a country in which the citizen is guaranteed the freedom of expres-
sion. But here the film's inciteful essence comes into play
If this film were shown in this country, the danger is very present that because of
the special power of persuasion contained in visual material, it would serve as an
effective instrument for incitement and for preparing the hearts of Arabs... to
assist in terrorist actions .... and at the same time would capture the sympathy of
young Jews who know no better and whose eyes have yet to see the truth of these
times.
Id. at 277-78 (emphasis added). This argument is internally inconsistent. If the Court had
been concerned only with incitement, it would not have discussed the danger that the film
would persuade young Jews; presumably the Court did not see a danger that they too
would aid terrorism. The film's effect on Jews was only an issue of freedom to receive
information; they should have been given the chance to decide whether the film distorted
the facts.
162. See supra notes 79-80, text accompanying note 156.
163. See supra note 81, text accompanying note 157.
164. 24(1) P.D. 408 (1970).
165. Section 179 of the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936, prohibits holding for sale or
distribution any "obscene printed or written matter, or any obscene picture, photograph,
drawing or model, or any other object tending to corrupt morals." 2 O.H.Y. (Ordinances)
810, 877.
166. 24(1) P.D. at 412 (quoting A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman
of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966)).
167. "An enlightened view requires us, as is common nowadays, to tolerate even a con-
siderable degree of erotic sexual descriptions, if they appear as an integral part of a work
with literary or scientific value that compensates for its pornographic aspect." 24(1) P.D.
at 412.
The Court has not always recognized a freedom of expression issue in obscenity cases. In
Weiss v. State of Israel, 17 P.D. 2310 (1963), demonstrators in front of the American
embassy who carried a poster saying "Americans go fuck yourselves with your H-Bomb"
were convicted of "behav[ing] in an... indecent manner in [a] public place." Id. at 2313.
In upholding the conviction, the Court rejected any consideration of a freedom of expres-
sion issue: "The clear political meaning of a poster does not cancel the indecent manner of
the language in which it is written, and the figurative meaning of the words does not clad
them with a fig leaf." Id. at 2324 (emphasis omitted). The 'Omer Court, despite its differ-
ent position, did not cite Weiss.
168. The defendant explained that his book's vulgar sexual references to God were
meant to "awaken the public from its slumber" for a "cultural war" against ultra-religious
Jews. 24(1) P.D. at 414-15.
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Board,1 69 the Court took a very different position. The Board banned
a play on the ground that it violated a law against material "tending to
outrage the religious feeling or belief of other persons."1 70 The Court
upheld the ban, stating that freedom of expression "must step back in
favor of" religious sensibilities.1 71 Thus, after applying a balancing
test in 'Omer, the Court categorically subordinated freedom of expres-
sion to other interests in Keynan.172
2. Application of Doctrine
The Israel Supreme Court has also been inconsistent in its appli-
cation of doctrine under the unwritten constitution. Specifically, the
Court has been inconsistent in its application of the Kol Ha'am 11
"probability" test, which the Court adopted instead of the repressive
"bad tendency" test. 173
Eleven years after Kol Ha'am II, in Jiris v. Northern District Com-
missioner, 74 the Court appeared to apply the "bad tendency" test, but
neither explicitly adopted it nor rejected the "probability" test. The
Court upheld the denial of an application to register as an association
under the Ottoman Law of Associations. 175 The Court held that the
group's goals 176 were inimical to the existence of the state, but it did
169. 26(2) P.D. 812 (1972).
170. "Any person who publishes any print, writing, picture or effigy calculated or tend-
ing to outrage the religious feeling or belief of other persons . . . is guilty of a misde-
meanor." Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936, § 149(a), 2 O.H.Y. (Ordinances) 810, 867-68.
The play reenacted the crucifixion of Jesus in a mocking way, portrayed Mary as a prosti-
tute, satirized trade in religious artifacts, and described a woman who used religious objects
for sexual purposes. See 26(2) P.D. at 813-14. The Court held that the play was a "serious
offense to the religious feelings of Christians." Id. at 813.
171. Id. at 814.
172. The concurrence found room for balancing. Instead of applying literally the term
"others" in the statute, the concurrence measured the offensiveness according to "the sensi-
bilities of a majority or considerable part of [a religious community] and not ... of a
minority with extreme views." Id. at 812 (Etzioni, J., concurring). The analysis of 'Omar
and Keynan is based on Lahav, Freedom of Expression in the Supreme Court (Hebrew), 7
MISHPATIM 375, 419 (1976/77).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 100-05.
174. 18(4) P.D. 673 (1964).
175. Section 3 of the Ottoman Law of Associations prohibits the establishment of
associations that are "founded on an illegal basis and opposed to law and morality, or
whose goal is to harm the public order or the territorial integrity of the country." Id. at
674-75.
176. The group's goals included:
The finding of a just solution to the Palestinian problem-seeing it as an indivisible
unit.., that restores its political existence.., and sees it as having the first right to
determine its fate for itself within the framework of the supreme aspirations of the
Arab people.
Support for the movement of liberation, unity, and socialism in the Arab
world ....
Id. at 675.
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not mention either the imminence of actual danger or the
"probability" test.
A year after Jiris, in Iredor v. Committee of Elections to the Sixth
Knesset,177 the Court upheld the Committee's disqualification of the
Socialist List from running for election to the Knesset on the ground
that its goal was to subvert the state.178 In affirming the Committee's
finding, the Court did not assess whether the danger that the Socialist
List would attempt action to implement its goals was imminent. Here,
too, the Court neither explicitly adopted the "bad tendency" test nor
mentioned the "probability" test.179
3. Consequences of Inconsistency Under an Unwritten Constitution
The inconsistency in these cases is attributable in part to the
absence of a written constitution. Because no fixed, formal standard
like the first amendment to the United States Constitution unites free-
dom of expression cases in Israel, the Court applies freedom of expres-
sion principles in new contexts on a case-by-case basis. When the
Court chooses to uphold the government's use of broad statutory pow-
ers to regulate expression, the doctrine of legislative sovereignty allows
the Court to defer without violating any written norms like the first
amendment. Therefore, if the Court takes an activist position in one
case, it can easily narrow or ignore that position in a later case, espe-
cially if the case arises in a different context.
When the Court cites legislative sovereignty as the sole reason for
declining to protect freedom of expression, the Court impairs its legiti-
macy in this area. In order to maintain its legitimacy, the Court must
exercise its power consistently.1 0  Instead, the Court sometimes
decides on the basis of the content of expression, taking an activist
177. 19(3) P.D. 365 (1965), noted in Guberman, Israel's Supra-Constitution, 2 ISR. L.
REV. 455 (1967).
178. Id. at 386-90. The candidates on the list were members of the outlawed El-Ard
group, see supra text accompanying notes 114-16, and had also tried to register as an associ-
ation under the Ottoman Law of Associations, see supra notes 175-76 and accompanying
text. 19(3) P.D. at 369 (Cohn, J., dissenting).
179. The dissent noted the applicability of the "probability" test and argued that it was
not satisfied. See id. at 381 (Cohn, J., dissenting). This Note's analysis oflredor and Jiris is
based on Lahav, supra note 172, at 414-16.
180. The power of the English courts, which is substantial despite the formal constraints
of parliamentary sovereignty, see supra note 27 and accompanying text, has been attributed
to the courts' consistency, i.e., their obedience to their own rules:
The manipulation by English courts of the rules concerning the binding force of
precedent is perhaps most honestly described ... as a successful bid to take powers
and use them. Here power acquires authority ex post facto from success ...
[W]hat makes possible these striking developments by courts of the most funda-
mental rules is, in great measure, the prestige gathered by the courts from their
unquestionably rule-governed operations over the vast, central areas of the law.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 150 (1961) (emphasis added).
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posture when it disagrees with the government and deferring when it
agrees. This exercise of "sporadic omnipotence"181 damages the
Court's prestige and makes its constitutional status unclear. 18 2
C. CAUSES OF THE COURT'S INCONSISTENCY
One cause of the Court's inconsistency may be periodic lapses
into a result-oriented approach. For example, some of the cases in
which the government limited its review involved expression of Pales-
tinian nationalist views. Judges might be lenient toward the govern-
ment when it prevents the expression of views similar to those of
groups involved in armed conflict with Israel. That was the argument
of an Israeli critic of the Iredor and Jiris decisions:
In both cases there were references to the finding of a solution to the Palestin-
ian problem and to the defense of the Palestinian people's interests.... Many
of us see in this idea a direct threat to our existence and political sovereignty.
However, there is a great distance between an instinctive reaction [to deny
expression] and a legal prohibition based on rational justification.' 83
The decisions in Ein-Gal and 'Ash provide further support for this
argument. 184
Another factor contributing to the Court's inconsistency is that it
181. Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, 12 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
182. For example, in Avidan v. Film & Theatre Censorship Board, 28(2) P.D. 766
(1974), it was unclear whether the Court's holding rested on the limits of its power of
review or its agreement with the Censorship Board on the merits. The Board banned the
petitioner's film on the ground that it was obscene and in bad taste. The Court noted that
the Board represented a wide cross-section of society. Id. at 769. For this reason the Court
considered itself inferior to the Board as a judge of good taste:
I can hardly imagine a case in which the Board would approve or disqualify.., a
non-documentary entertainment film after careful and balanced consideration...
and in which we would see ourselves as having more authority than [the Board]
and free to reject its opinion.
Id. at 771. However, the Court watched the film and expressed its agreement with the
Board's judgment of the content: "I was not very impressed with what the petitioner calls
the liturgical and philosophical spirit that characterizes it. The sex scenes ...are so
numerous and bold that they cast a shadow over the rest . .." Id. at 769. Because the
Court purported to base its decision on a lack of power of review, there was no reason to
watch the film or express an opinion on it.
I saw no point that we, as a court, view the film. The decision on the merits,
whether such a film is worthy of being shown or not, can only be the result of the
viewers' taste and world view. It is futile to ask here what the "reasonable man"
says ....
Id. (Witkon, J., concurring). See also supra note 154.
183. Lahav, supra note 172, at 416.
184. See supra notes 132-36, 158-63 and accompanying text.
The general rule is that in matters of national security, so long as the administra-
tive agency has acted within the boundaries of its lawful jurisdiction, and in good
faith, the Court will not intervene.... [I]n the early years of statehood, when
security problems were graver, the Supreme Court was more willing than it is
today to intervene in favour of the citizen in cases involving security problems.
Shetreet, Reflections on the Protection of the Rights of the Individual. Form and Substance,
12 ISR. L. REV. 32, 59 (1977) (citing, among other cases, Kol Ha'am If).
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normally sits in three-judge panels, 185 even though there are currently
twelve judges on the Court. 18 6 Contradictory decisions may result
from differences in the judges' views of the necessary legislative defer-
ence and in their perceptions of the danger of free expression in a par-
ticular case. 187 The Court can also sit in panels of odd numbers over
three by order of the President of the Court, the Deputy President, or
the three-judge panel originally assigned to the case.18 8 Five-judge
panels heard all of the cases in which the Court invalidated laws that
violated section 4 of Basic Law-The Knesset. 189 The use of five-
judge panels in these critical cases implies that the Court recognizes a
danger of inconsistency in the three-judge panel. The Court has even
stated that it is more likely to follow a Supreme Court precedent
decided by a five-judge panel than one decided by a three-judge
panel. 190
The Court's unclear self-image also contributes to its inconsis-
tency. In its activist decisions, the Court seems to perceive itself as a
constitutional court, i.e., a lawmaking body. But some elements in the
Court's composition detract from the Court's image as a lawmaking
body, suggesting instead a simple court of appeal. First, a three-judge
panel does not project the powerful image of a lawmaking body that a
court sitting in full panel would project. A three-judge panel may also
be hesitant to make far-reaching pronouncements of law in the name
of the Court. Second, the Court is, in part, a first court of appeal.
Although part of the Court's jurisdiction is discretionary, 191 the Court
185. Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, § 26, 1123 S.H. 198, 202 (1984)
(originally enacted as Courts Law, 5717-1957, § 3, 11 L.S.I. 157 (1956/57)).
186. Judges in Israel are appointed by the President on recommendation of a committee
comprising three members of the Supreme Court, two lawyers elected by the bar associa-
tion, two Members of Knesset, the Minister of Justice, and one other minister. Tenure lasts
until the compulsory retirement age of seventy. Judges can be removed from office for
statutorily specified causes upon a finding by a judicial disciplinary tribunal, which is made
up mostly of Supreme Court judges. Judges Law, 5713-1953, §§ 5, 16, 17, 21-23, 7 L.S.I.
124, 125-28 (1952/53); Shetreet, supra note 31, at 992-93.
187. Cf Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Court of Appeals, 1968
Wis. L. REv. 461, 481 ("an element of justice-by-lottery is inherent in the three-member
panel device"). On ideological divisions among the judges of the Israel Supreme Court, see
Shetreet, supra note 31, at 988; Shetreet, supra note 184, at 63-67.
188. Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, §§ 26(1)-(2), 30(a), 1123 S.H.
198, 202 (1984) (originally enacted as Court Law, 5717-1957, §§ 3(1), 8(a)-(b), 11 L.S.I.
157, 159 (1956/57).
189. See cases discussed supra, Section I.B.3.
190. Boronovski v. Chief Rabbi of Israel, 25(1) P.D. 7, 30 (1971); Neiman v. Chairman
of the Cent. Elections Comm., Eleventh Knesset, 38(3) P.D. 85, 87 (1984). These two cases
differ from an earlier case in which the Court stated, more formalistically, that a precedent
by an enlarged panel had no extra weight. See Ramm v. Minister of Fin., 8 P.D. 494, 504
(1954), discussed infra note 194.
191. The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction in its capacity as the High Court of
Justice: it "shall deal with matters in which it deems it necessary to grant relief in the
interests ofjustice and which are not within the jurisdiction of any other court or tribunal."
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also must hear appeals against judgments by the district courts. 192
The district courts, which are one of Israel's two main types of trial
courts, have a wide area of original jurisdiction covering crimes carry-
ing a prison sentence of a year or more and non-real estate civil claims
for over approximately two-thousand dollars.
193
An early case holding that the Court is bound by its own prece-
dents except in very rare circumstances, Ramm v. Minister of
Finance,194 is further evidence that the Court may not perceive itself as
a lawmaking body. After Ramm, the Knesset freed the Court from its
own precedents, 195 but Ramm's minimalist view of the Court's law-
making role probably continues to influence some judges.
Basic Law-Adjudication § 15(c), 1110 S.H. 78, 80 (1984) (originally enacted as Courts
Law 5717-1957, § 7(a), 11 L.S.I. 157, 158 (1956/57)). The Supreme Court also has dis-
cretion to hear appeals from judgments that the District Courts render on appeals from
decisions of the Magistrates' Courts and from interlocutory decisions of the District Courts
in civil matters. Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, § 41, 1123 S.M. 198, 205
(1984), (originally enacted as Courts Law, 5717-1957, § 19(b), 11 L.S.I. 157, 161 (1956/
57)).
192. Basic Law-Adjudication §§ 15(b), 17, 1110 S.H. 78, 80 (1984); Courts Law [Con-
solidated Version], 5744-1984, § 41(a), 1123 S.11. 198, 205 (1984), (originally enacted as
Courts Law, 5717-1957, §§ 6, 19(a), 11 L.S.I. 157, 158, 161 (1956/57)).
193. Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, § 40 (District Courts' original
jurisdiction), § 51 (Magistrates' Courts' jurisdiction over lesser crimes, civil claims for less
than two million shekels, and claims concerning the possession, use, or partition of real
property), 1123 S.H. 198, 204, 206 (1984), (originally enacted as Courts Law, 5717-1957,
§§ 18, 28, 11 L.S.I. 157, 161 (1956/57)).
194. Ramm v. Minister of Fin., 8 P.D. 495 (1954) (unanimous five-judge panel). The
Court listed the following exceptions to the binding effect of its precedents:
1) A judgment given without reasons does not bind the Court.
2) The Court is free to choose from conflicting precedents.
3) The Court is not bound if the previous judgment ignored a statute or
regulation.
4) "if a long time after the precedent is established it becomes clear that circum-
stances have changed so thoroughly and unforeseeably that the precedent is
absolutely unsuitable under present circumstances."
Id. at 503.
Some judges have held the opposite view: "If I have to choose between truth and cer-
tainty, I prefer truth." Yehoshua v. Appeals Tribunal, 9 P.D. 617 (1955), 2 S.J. 46, 60
(1954-58) (Witkon, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 2 PSAKIM 'ELYON 5
(1949)). Judge Witkon's view was based on an ambitious perception of the Supreme
Court's lawmaking function:
We stand at the threshold of our development as a nation and as a society, and
there is still a long road for us to tread before we reach a final form for our juris-
prudence, and the shaping of the law in Israel. In such a situation one needs,
sometimes, to look afresh at the rules, even if they have been but recently estab-
lished and even if the conditions of our life cannot be said to have altered in the
meantime.
2 S.J. at 60-61.
A year before Ramm, in Kol Ha'am II, the Court ignored a very recent precedent, but
did not discuss the issue of the force of precedent. See supra note 92.
195. "A precedent established by the Supreme Court binds every Court, except the
Supreme Court." Basic Law-Adjudication § 20(b), 1110 S.H. 78, 81 (1984), (originally
enacted as Courts Law, 5717-1957, § 33(b), 11 L.S.I. 157, 163 (1956/57)).
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D. PROPOSALS TO INCREASE THE COURT'S CONSISTENCY
Three proposed laws that have been before the Knesset for several
years would bring more consistency to the Supreme Court's adjudica-
tion of freedom of expression issues. Two proposals for a bill of rights
contain provisions for freedom of expression. 196 The proposed Basic
Law-Legislation would establish a constitutional court with power to
invalidate laws that are inconsistent with Basic Laws.1 97 The constitu-
tional court would be the existing Supreme Court sitting in a panel of
nine or a greater odd number.198
The Knesset should enact a bill of rights and establish a constitu-
tional court with powers of explicit review.199 Substituting explicit
review of laws for the Supreme Court's present implicit interpretative
review would probably force the Court to state the grounds of its deci-
sions more expansively and forcefully. Explicit review would make it
harder for the Court to retreat subtly from the positions of earlier
cases. Furthermore, deciding constitutional cases as a single body
196. Proposal for Basic Law-Bill of Fundamental Human Rights §§ 33-37, 1612 H..H
110, 114-15 (1983) (freedom of expression, art, science, research, teaching, assembly, and
association); Proposal for Basic Law-Human and Civil Rights §§ 10-13, 1085 H.H. 448,
449 (1973), translated in Ratner, Constitutions, Majoritarianism & Judicial Review: The
Function of a Bill of Rights in Israel and the United States, 26 AM. J. COMp. L. 373, 395
(1978).
197. Proposal for Basic Law-Legislation § 13, 1364 H.H. 328, 332-33 (1978).
198. Id. § 13(b), 1364 H.H. at 332.
199. This Note argues that the Knesset should enact a bill of rights and establish a
constitutional court to improve the Supreme Court's consistency in deciding freedom of
expression cases. The argument is based on a premise that the Court considers itself
empowered to overturn the legislature's will in some cases. If the Court exercises such
power, it should do so explicitly and subject itself to rules defining that power. See supra
Section III.B.3.
This Note does not take a position on the question of whether a bill of rights increases
protection of individual rights. In countries that have considered adopting a bill of rights,
the effectiveness of a bill of rights has been a subject of debate. Aside from the argument
that judicial review is undemocratic, which does not address the need to protect the indi-
vidual from society, two common arguments against a bill of rights hold that it cannot
protect the individual:
1) The political process is the ultimate guardian of individual freedom; courts are
too weak to stop a society intent on repressing minorities.
2) A bill of rights limits the protection of individual freedom to the enumerated
guarantees; attempts to assert other freedoms in the political process will have a
decreased chance of success because such freedoms were excluded from the bill of
rights.
See Lloyd, Do We Need a Bill of Rights?, 39 MOD. L. REv. 121 (1976) (England);
Schneiser, The Case Against Entrenchment of a Canadian Bill of Rights, I DALHOUSIE L.J.
15 (1973); Supreme Court Judge Landau, A Constitution as Israel's Supreme Law?
(Hebrew), 20 HAPRAKLIT 30 (1971). Contra Supreme Court Judge Agranat, The Contribu-
tion of the Judiciary to the Legislative Endeavor (Hebrew), 10 IYUNEI MISHPAT 233 (1984)
(calling for adoption of bill of rights); Lahav & Kretzmer, A Bill ofRightsfor Israel: A Step
Forward? (Hebrew), 7 MISHPATIM 154 (1976/77) (same).
In the debate over the adoption of the United States Constitution, Alexander Hamilton
went even further, arguing that a bill of rights would endanger the individual. The Federal-
ist No. 84 (A. Hamilton), at 514 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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would enhance the Court's stature as a lawmaking body, and there
would be less inconsistency resulting from ideological differences
among the judges. Finally, the Knesset should restructure the appeals
system to increase the Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdiction and
to decrease appeals of right. By concentrating on cases chosen for
their legal significance, the Supreme Court can better define its law-
making function.20° If the Knesset continues to refuse to establish a
constitutional court, the Court should use enlarged panels in constitu-
tional cases as often as its workload permits.
IV. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
Comparison with the United States provides much of the perspec-
tive for Section III's evaluation of the Israel Supreme Court's perform-
ance and for the suggestions to improve it. Comparison between the
two systems also points to implications for constitutional adjudication
in the United States. Two factors make such a comparison possible.
First, similar freedom of expression values guide both countries'
courts.20 1 Second, there are similarities between constitutional adjudi-
cation in Israel and the United States, as explained below.
A. ADJUDICATION UNDER THE AMERICAN
"UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION"
Professor Grey has noted that much of the American constitu-
tion, i.e., the suprastatutory norms that guide judicial review of legisla-
tion,20 2 is unwritten:
In the important cases, reference to an analysis of the constitutional text plays
a minor role. The dominant norms of decision are those large conceptions of
governmental structure and individual rights that are at best referred to, and
whose content is scarcely at all specified, in the written Constitution-dual
federalism, vested rights, fair procedure, equality before the law. 20 3
When courts make decisions that are difficult to couch in the Constitu-
tion's literal terms, they sometimes grasp at written rules instead of
expounding the principles that guide their decisions. "[Our courts
200. See Editorial Note, A High Court of Appeals (Hebrew), 15 MISHPATIM 495 (1984);
Quat, On the Structure of the Supreme Court (Hebrew), 22 HAPRAKLIT 249 (1965/66).
Contra Supreme Court Judge Landau, Trends in the Decisions of the Supreme Court
(Hebrew), 8 IYUNEI MISHPAT 500, 501 (1982) (the Supreme Court's "special power"
comes from a blend of lawmaking and appellate functions; "the Court should not breathe
the rarefied air of Olympus by dealing only with esoteric matters").
201. See supra note 4.
202. On this connotation of "constitution," see supra note 2.
203. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 707-08
(1975).
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tend] to resort to bad legislative history and strained reading of consti-
tutional language to support results that would be better justified by
explication of contemporary moral and political ideals not drawn from
the constitutional text. ' '2°4 When courts engage in semantics to infer
constitutional rights and to exclude acts literally protected by the Con-
stitution, they provide little guidance for other cases.
The United States Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to
the first amendment's absolute protection of speech and extended pro-
tection to activities that are not literally speech. In construing the first
amendment in terms of underlying values, the Court's performance
has been mixed. The Court has candidly stated that the first amend-
ment's protections are subject to balancing against competing societal
interests, despite the amendment's absolute formulation.20 5 The Court
has also departed from the first amendment's literal terms in excluding
"fighting words, °206 obscenity,20 7 libel,208 and commercial speech20 9
from first amendment protection.
In creating the commercial and libel exceptions, the Court did
not sufficiently explain what was being excluded from protection. It
merely referred to the common law definition of libel,210 and it did not
fully define commercial speech or justify its exclusion.211 When the
Court finally examined the commercial and libel exceptions in light of
the policies underlying the first amendment, it abandoned the position
that commercial speech and libel are completely unprotected.212
Thus, the Court itself showed that its earlier, sketchily-reasoned deci-
sions created confusing law.
204. Id. at 706.
205. E.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961).
206. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("[words] which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace").
207. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957) ("implicit in the history of the First
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance").
208. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-56, 266 (1952).
209. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
210. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 254-55. Cf New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964):
[Statements] of this Court to the effect that the Constitution does not protect
libelous publications... do not foreclose our inquiry here.... [W]e are compelled
by neither precedent nor policy to give any more weight to the epithet "libel" than
we have to other "more labels" of state law.
Id. at 268-69 (footnote omitted).
211. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See also Note, Freedom of
Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1191, 1192 (1965): "It is impossi-
ble to formulate a single role of first amendment protection for economic speech in these
diverse areas...."
212. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761-65
(1976) (commercial speech); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (libel).
See also infra note 217; 1 DORSEN, BENDER & NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 700 (4th ed. 1976).
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The Court has been reluctant to develop a theory of the first
amendment status of nonverbal expression. In cases in which the
Court has protected nonverbal expression, it has avoided comprehen-
sive discussions of policy, focusing instead on the particular circum-
stances of the case.213 The Court has also relied on formalistic terms
such as "pure speech, ' 214 "speech" and "nonspeech" elements of the
same conduct, 215 and conduct "akin to 'pure speech.' "216
Reliance on formal distinctions among types of expression creates
uncertainty about the scope of the first amendment and invites courts
to make subjective decisions on the basis of the content of the regu-
lated expression.217 The Supreme Court should be as forthright in
extending protection beyond the first amendment's literal terms as it
has been in qualifying the first amendment's absolute guarantees.
Instead of manipulating the language of the first amendment to
include or exclude an activity from protection in a single case, the
Court should take a long-range view, gleaning the purpose behind the
language and striving toward comprehensive definitions of rights.218
In interpreting open-textured constitutional provisions such as the first
amendment, courts should be candid about the fact that they are mak-
ing constitutional law.219
213. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 408-11 (1974); Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 137, 141-142 (1966) (plurality opinion). '
214. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) ("pure speech" gets more protection
than speech mixed with conduct). See also Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 817 (1975).
215. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) ("when 'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct.... governmental interest in
regulating the non-speech element can justify limitations on First Amendment freedoms").
216. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) (wearing arm-
band as antiwar protest is "akin to pure speech"). See New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480
F.2d 693, 698 (10th Cir. 1973) (wearing hair in traditional Pawnee Indian style is not "akin
to pure speech"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973).
217. See Note, The Invisible Hand and the Clenched Fist: Is There a Safe Way to Picket
Under the First Amendment?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 167 (1974) (reliance on conduct/speech
distinction has caused inconsistency in picketing cases). When the Supreme Court aban-
doned the commercial speech exception, it pointed out the inconsistencies in the cases that
had applied the exception. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 758-60 (1976).
218. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA
L. REV. 29, 61 (1973) (symbolic speech should get full first amendment protection); Hen-
kin, Forward On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 79 (1968) (same).
This is not an argument to ignore the text of the Constitution. Some constitutional pro-
visions provide clear answers for specific problems; such provisions should be applied
according to their plain meaning. Other provisions require interpretation. The first
amendment, for example, would make little sense if it were applied absolutely and to all
speech. Even commentators who think that the Supreme Court has gone beyond legitimate
lawmaking in interpreting the Constitution advocate interpreting the first amendment
according to a specific view of its purpose, rather than literally. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-23 (1971) (protection
should apply only to political speech).
219. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1977).
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B. AVOIDANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Under the doctrine of avoidance of constitutional questions, when
a case involves a possibly unconstitutional application of a statute, the
court will apply another interpretation, if available, in order to avoid
deciding the constitutional question. 220 The reluctance to declare a
law unconstitutional unless absolutely necessary stems from deference
to the legislature and the federal courts' "case and controversy" juris-
diction.221 In avoiding constitutional questions, courts occasionally so
distort the statute that it is clear that the statute would be unconstitu-
tional as applied. 222 In such cases the court has made a constitutional
decision, but has couched it in terms of statutory construction. 223
This method of constitutional adjudication resembles the Israel
Supreme Court's method of construing a statute to narrow or nullify
its force.
Israel's experience suggests that, for the sake of consistency,
American courts should not avoid constitutional questions that are
squarely presented. Absence of a formal holding of unconstitutional-
ity in a decision has enabled the Israel Supreme Court to ignore the
constitutional basis of its original decision in later decisions. Simi-
larly, if an American court leaves intact a statute whose application in
a given case would be unconstitutional, that court and lower courts
can easily ignore the unarticulated constitutional basis of the original
decision. Furthermore, an unconstitutional law left on the books
causes unremedied harm to people who do not challenge its enforce-
ment.224 Confrontation of clearly presented constitutional questions
does not depart from an American court's proper deference to the leg-
islature, because the duty to uphold the Constitution is superior to the
duty to carry out the intent of the legislature.
CONCLUSION
Despite the absence of a written constitution, the Israel Supreme
Court has established freedom of expression as a fundamental princi-
ple of Israeli law and has taken responsibility for protecting it. The
220. See generally Note, Supreme Court Interpretation of Statutes to Avoid Constitutional
Questions, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 633 (1953).
221. Id. at 633 n.4, 646.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173 (1965) (interpreting conscien-
tious objector statute to avoid requirement that objection be based on belief in God). "[MVe
have gone to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on constitu-
tional grounds." Id. at 180 (Douglas, J., concurring) (advocating invalidation of statute).
223. Note, supra note 220, at 638; Note, Avoidance of Constitutional Issues in Civil
Rights Cases, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 427, 429 & n.12 (1948).
224. "The unnecessary postponement of decision on the validity of these enactments
[infringing on civil rights] can vitally affect the forces of political restraint upon which the
functioning of our government depends in so large a degree. Id. at 435.
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legislative and executive branches have, on the whole, accepted the
Court's role in this area.
The Court's protection of freedom of expression has been incon-
sistent, partly because the Court cannot openly refuse to apply a stat-
ute. When it finds that a statute improperly restricts expression, the
Court explains its decision as an interpretation of the statute. The
incomplete explanation of the decision makes it possible to reach a
contradictory decision in a later case without openly confronting the
earlier decision. A written constitution would increase consistency
because the Court could openly refuse to apply unconstitutional laws.
Even under a written constitution, there is a danger of inconsis-
tency. When the United States Supreme Court does not fully explain
its interpretation of the first amendment's "freedom of speech" clause,
it does not provide sufficient guidance for future cases. Thus, contra-
dictions can occur for the same reasons they occur under Israel's
unwritten constitution.
In order to maintain legitimacy in constitutional cases, courts
must exercise their power openly and consistently. A written constitu-
tion enables them to exercise power openly, but does not guarantee
consistency. Consistency is possible only if decisions are fully
explained, and fully explained decisions sometimes require non-literal
interpretation of constitutional provisions. If courts interpret such
provisions comprehensively and with a long-range view, accepting that
interpretation entails making constitutional law, they will enhance
their legitimacy rather than diminish it.
Daniel J. Rothstein
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